A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902: The Long War Series Occasional Paper 25

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) presents Long War Series Occupational Paper (OP) 25, “A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902, by Robert Ramsey. OP 25 is a companion to OP 24, “Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902. IN OP 24 Ramsey analyzed case studies from two different Philippine military districts discovering several themes relevant to today’s ongoing operations in the Long War. IN OP 25 he focuses on the philosophy that guided Bell in the conduct of one of those campaigns. Over the ages military historians have employed many types of research and writing to understand, and ultimately learn from, the past. These methods range from studies of grand strategy to studies of small unit tactics to, most recently, studies of the history of war and society. OP 25 takes a different approach, one whose origins are old and rather infrequently practiced today. This technique examines the inner thinking of a commander in an attempt to understand how he viewed the operation he was conducting. In reading Bell’s words today, it becomes clear he displayed at least two of the key attributes that constitute Clausewitz’s concept of military genius – the inner light or vision that points a commander toward victory in the fog of war and the determination to act decisively in the fact of danger. Mr. Ramsey, in his introduction, makes note of British Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell’s endorsement of this kind of history: “The real way to get value out of the study of military history is to take particular situations, and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a decision, realize the conditions in which the decision was made, and then see in what way you could have improved upon it.” This quote captures the intent of this study. The collected messages and circulars issued by Bell to his subordinate commanders, and the text of the US Army’s famous General Orders 100 from which he drew that guidance, provide the means to accomplish what Clausewitz and Wavell urged us to do.~