Since the early 20th century the US Army has used Civil War and other battlefields as “outdoor classrooms” in which to educate and train its officers. Employing a methodology developed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1906, both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and US Army War College conducted numerous battlefield staff rides to prepare officers for duties in both war and peace. Often interrupted by the exigencies of the nation’s wars, the tradition was renewed and reinvigorated at Fort Leavenworth in the early 1980s. Since 1983 the Leavenworth Staff Ride Team has guided military students on battlefields around the world. For those unable to avail themselves directly of the team’s services the Combat Studies Institute has begun to produce a series of staff ride guides to serve in lieu of a Fort Leavenworth instructor. The newest volume in that series, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Gudmens’ “Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862” is a valuable study that examines the key considerations in planning and executing the campaign and battle. Modern tacticians and operational planners will find themes that still resonate. Gudmens demonstrates that leaders in Blue and Gray, in facing the daunting tasks of this, the bloodiest battle to this point on the continent, rose to the challenge. They were able to meet this challenge through planning, discipline, ingenuity, leadership, and persistence—themes worthy of reflection by today’s leaders. Combat Studies Institute.

Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862

History

Institute, Combat Studies

Gudmens, LTC Jeffrey J.

Military

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units is the 10th study in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work is an out-growth of concerns identified by the authors of On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Specifically, these authors called into question the use of long-range surveillance (LRD) assets by commanders during that campaign and suggested an assessment ought to be made about their continuing utility and means of employment. Major (Retired) James Gebhardt, of CSI, researched and wrote this Occasional Paper with that end in view. IN this study, Gebhardt surveys the US Army’s historical experience with LRRP and LRS units from the 1960s Cold War and Vietnam War, through their resurgence in the 1980s and use in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STROM, to the advent of the GWOT. The paper’s analytical framework examines each era of LRS units in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and personnel. In doing so, the author makes a strong case for continuing the LRS capability in the Army’s force structure. The variety of environments and enemies likely to be faced by the military in the GWOT continues to demand the unique human intelligence abilities of trained and organized LRS units. As the Army leads the Armed Forces of the United States in combating terrorists where they live, the lessons found in this survey remain timely and relevant.~

Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units: Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 10

Gebhardt, US Army (Retired), Major James F.

It has been said that the only thing new in the world is the history you don’t know. This Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper (OP) is a timely reminder for the US Army about the history we do not know, or at least the history we do not know well. The Army has recently embarked on massive advisory missions with foreign militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the globe. We are simultaneously engaged in a huge effort to learn how to conduct those missions for which we do no consistently prepare. Mr. Robert Ramsey’s historical study examines three cases in which the US Army has performed this same mission in the last half of the 20th century. In Korea during the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and in El Salvador in the 1980s the Army was tasked to build and advise host nation armies during a time of war. The author makes several key arguments about the lesson the Army though it learned at the time. Among the key points Mr. Ramsey makes are the need for US advisors to have extensive language and cultural training, the lesser importance for them of technical and tactical skills training, and the need to adapt US organizational concepts, training techniques, and tactics to local conditions. Accordingly, he also notes the great importance of the host nation’s leadership buying into and actively supporting the development of a performance-based selection, training, and promotion system. To its credit, the institutional Army learned these hard lessons, form successes and failures, during and after each of the cases examined in this study. However, they were often forgotten as the Army prepared for the next major conventional conflict. These lessons are still important and relevant today. In fact, prior to its publication the conclusions of this study were delivered by the author to several of the Army’s current advisory training task forces. We at CSI believe this GWOT OP can contribute significant insights to the Army as it works to prepare for and conduct its current advisory missions.~

Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador: Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18

Ramsey III, Robert D.

John McGrath's The Other End of the Spear is a timely historical analysis and an important follow-on work to his earlier analysis of troop density trends in CSI Occasional Paper 16, Boots on the Ground. As that work showed, this paper also shows the timeless value of history and its relevance to current events. Boots on the Ground analyzed the ratio between the numbers of troops employed in military operations relative to the population in a number of irregular conflicts. This study analyzes the composition of such forces to answer the question: what have been the historical trends in the ratio of deployed forces directly engaged in fighting, relative to those engaged in noncombat functions? This ratio is commonly, if inaccurately, called the "tooth-to-tail ratio." McGrath's study finds that the tooth-to-tail ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have both increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. A segment of American military historians and policy makers has long been enamored with a genre of military history that seeks to quantify war, to reduce it to known variables, and to posit solutions to future military conflicts based on mathematical formulae. The practice of war contains a strong element of science, but in the end, the practice of war is an art. This study cannot be used to guarantee victory simply by composing a force of the proportional figures presented in the conclusion. However, it does provide a good baseline, based on historical precedent, for future planning. This work, coupled with Boots on the Ground, provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Policy makers, commanders, and staff officers should use these two studies as a basis from which to begin their analysis of the particular campaign at hand. They will then need to apply their understanding of the objectives, the nature of the conflict, and local and regional culture and conditions to the analysis to create a winning military plan. It is our belief at CSI that this kind of historical analysis will inform and educate today's military and civilian leaders as they carry out our nation's most important policies.~

The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations: The Long War Series Occasional Paper 23

McGrath, John J.

Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902: The Long War Series Occasional Paper 24

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) presents Long War Series Occupational Paper (OP) 25, “A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902, by Robert Ramsey. OP 25 is a companion to OP 24, “Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902. IN OP 24 Ramsey analyzed case studies from two different Philippine military districts discovering several themes relevant to today’s ongoing operations in the Long War. IN OP 25 he focuses on the philosophy that guided Bell in the conduct of one of those campaigns. Over the ages military historians have employed many types of research and writing to understand, and ultimately learn from, the past. These methods range from studies of grand strategy to studies of small unit tactics to, most recently, studies of the history of war and society. OP 25 takes a different approach, one whose origins are old and rather infrequently practiced today. This technique examines the inner thinking of a commander in an attempt to understand how he viewed the operation he was conducting. In reading Bell’s words today, it becomes clear he displayed at least two of the key attributes that constitute Clausewitz’s concept of military genius – the inner light or vision that points a commander toward victory in the fog of war and the determination to act decisively in the fact of danger. Mr. Ramsey, in his introduction, makes note of British Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell’s endorsement of this kind of history: “The real way to get value out of the study of military history is to take particular situations, and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a decision, realize the conditions in which the decision was made, and then see in what way you could have improved upon it.” This quote captures the intent of this study. The collected messages and circulars issued by Bell to his subordinate commanders, and the text of the US Army’s famous General Orders 100 from which he drew that guidance, provide the means to accomplish what Clausewitz and Wavell urged us to do.~

A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902: The Long War Series Occasional Paper 25

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, "We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War" by CSI historian Mr. Matt M. Matthews. The outcome of the war that was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts throughout the world. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished. Matthews's historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. IN research this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field, many of whom had not previously been interviewed. The result is an insightful, comprehensive examination of the war. In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that terrorist groups around the world are capable of learning from, adapting to, and exploiting weaknesses in conventional military forces. Inasmuch as the US Army has focused almost exclusively on irregular warfare since 2001, the lessons offered in this analysis are particularly relevant. We believe that this study will be of great use to the US Army as it conducts current operations and prepares for an uncertain future in which potential enemies are watching and learning.~

We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War: The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26

Matthews, Matt M.

Middle East

This publication offers a lucid and well-researched analysis of irregular warfare during the American Civil War. Dr. Martin’s focus on insurgent operations in the western border region brings fresh insights to this area of study. Moreover, the history of insurgency in these western states offers a greater understanding of irregular warfare to those who may be tasked with mounting counterinsurgency operations in the not so distant future. This short period in American History has captured the imagination of Americans and spurred them to consume the many volumes written about this brother-against-brother conflict. Most of these volumes have dealt with the important battles of the war, which pitted massive armies from the North and South against each other in a struggle to determine whether the country would separate or stay together. These battles, highlighted by Gettysburg, Antietam, Vicksburg, Fredericksburg, and others too numerous to mention, were the predecessors of similar grand conflicts that would rack Europe and the world in the decades to follow. For the first time in history, an entire nation mobilized to conduct a war that would eventually spill over and affect most of the population. From the gentlemanly preparation for the First Battle of Bull Run to the consuming power of Sherman’s march to the sea, the American Civil War involved far more of the American population than war in Europe historically had involved. Least understood of the effects on this population, and least studied, is the personal war conducted in the Border States, where the North met the South. This violence was not the type found on the battlefield at Gettysburg, where hoards of men in blue or gray shot at each other from considerable distance, finally moving to close quarters combat. This was a war pitted men with strong beliefs supporting one side against individuals they believed to be their enemy. The hatreds and feuds that stayed below the surface in a civilized society were freed by the all-consuming violence of this war, allowing men to act in ways that would have been unacceptable at any other time. While the Union officials tried to establish rules of war to control this personal violence, they were markedly unsuccessful. The border war would eventually degrade to such a level that death was not enough punishment for supporting the wrong side. Actions previously reserved to savages and uncivilized people would now become common as a part of the border violence. This breakdown in society may be a major reason this part of the war has been given inadequate attention over the years. Through the Second World War, combat was for the most part still a relatively conventional event, with the rules being followed by the belligerents under a common agreement. Since then, more and more conflicts throughout the world have been fought unconventionally. The more common occurrence of this type of conflict has given it more credibility as a viable form of warfare and has sparked a growth in the study of irregular warfare through history. While the reality is that larger military nations continue to question the validity of this type of warfare, it has become commonplace in the modern world and has to be understood. This study is a product of that movement to further understand irregular warfare and examine its importance in history. The author hopes to clarify this portion of the greater conflict, portraying the social and psychological impacts on the population of the border, as well as the military effects generated by the irregular war and attempts to show the parallels that exist between actions and reactions during this conflict and similar instances in the more modern irregular war fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not meant to be a history of these more modern conflicts, but to point out the similarities that exist in the actions of regular and irregular warriors in these two periods.

Third War: Irregular Warfare on the Western Border, 1861-1865: Leavenworth Papers No. 23

Martin, Ph.D., James B.

Americas

This study, “Survival Through Adaptations: The Chinese Red Army and the Extermination Campaigns, 1927-1936,” analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to determine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military forces and also successfully overcame the threats to its existence posed by changing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During this period, the CCP attempted to develop, expand, and professionalize the Chinese Red Army as a way to defend Communist base areas from a series of Kuomingtang (KMT) Extermination Campaigns. Also during these years, changes in the CCP leadership often placed the Red Army in dangerous situations by underestimating the KMT military threat and overestimating Red Army capabilities. This re-examination of the origin and development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army looks at the Chinese Red Army’s strategy, tactics, organization, and training and identifies four themes that helped it adapt and survive: a pragmatic strategy focused on long-term success; creating local populace support through adaptation; strong soldier recruiting, training, and retention; and a comprehensive officer development system.

Survival Through Adaptation: The Chinese Red Army and The Extermination Campaigns, 1927-1936: Art of War Papers (Cambridge Companions to Literature)

Hsu, Major, US Army, Wilbur W.

Arts & Photography

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