US Strategic Arms Policy in the Cold War: Negotiation and Confrontation over SALT, 1969-1979 (Cold War History)

Tal, David

Reference

Routledge

Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948.

War in Palestine, 1948 (Israeli History, Politics and Society)

War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy (Israeli History, Politics, and Society)

The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 quickly ushered in a popular and political movement toward nuclear disarmament. Across the globe heads of state, high-ranking ministers, and bureaucrats led intense efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements. Ultimately these efforts failed. In The American Nuclear Disamament Dilemma, David Tal offers a detailed analysis of the United States policy from 1945 to the summer of 1963, exploring the reasons for failure and revealing the complex motivations that eventually led to the Limited Test Ban treaty.While previous books have focused on the policies of specific administrations, Tal is the first author to consider negotiations as an evolving phenomenon that preoccupied three presidents, from Truman to Kennedy. Drawing on extensive archival research, the author examines the profound dilemma faced by all three leaders: politically forced to engage in negotiations that they did not truly want to succeed. The United States, at that time, firmly believed that the nuclear arms race did not inevitably lead to war; to the contrary, nuclear weapons were the greatest guarantee that war would not happen.

The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963 (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution)

History

Americas

Syracuse University Press

<p>Laying the foundation for an understanding of US-Israeli relations, this lively and accessible book provides critical background on the origins and development of the 'special' relations between Israel and the United States. Questioning the usual neo-realist approach to understanding this relationship, David Tal instead suggests that the relations between the two nations were constructed on idealism, political culture, and strategic ties. Based on a diverse range of primary sources collected in archives in both Israel and the United States, The Making of an Alliance discusses the development of relations built through constant contact between people and ideas, showing how presidents and Prime Ministers, state officials, and ordinary people from both countries, impacted one another. It was this constancy of religion, values, and history, serving the bedrock of the relations between the two countries and peoples, over which the ephemeral was negotiated.</p>

The Making of an Alliance: The Origins and Development of the US-Israel Relationship

Middle East

Cambridge University Press

The Making of an Alliance

War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy

This book examines the negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms during the Cold War, from 1969 to 1979. The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, which were concluded in two agreements SALT I and SALT II (with only the first ratified), marked a major change in the history of arms control negotiations. For the first time, in the relatively short history of nuclear weapons and negotiations over nuclear disarmament, the two major nuclear powers had agreed to put limits on the size of their nuclear strategic arms. However, the negotiations between the US and USSR were the easy part of the process. The more difficult part was the negotiations among the Americans. Through the study of a decade of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms in the Cold War, this book examines the forces that either allowed US presidents and senior officials to pave a path toward a US arms limitation policy, or prevented them from doing so. Most importantly, the book discusses the meaning of these negotiations and agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, and seeks to identify the intention of the negotiators: Were they aiming at making the world a safer place? What was the purpose of the negotiations and agreements within US strategic thinking, both militarily and diplomatically? Were they aimed at improving relations with the Soviet Union, or only at enhancing the strategic balance as one component of the strategic nuclear deterrence between the two powers?  This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War history, arms control, US foreign policy and international relations in general.

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