The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963 (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution)

The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 quickly ushered in a popular and political movement toward nuclear disarmament. Across the globe heads of state, high-ranking ministers, and bureaucrats led intense efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements. Ultimately these efforts failed. In The American Nuclear Disamament Dilemma, David Tal offers a detailed analysis of the United States policy from 1945 to the summer of 1963, exploring the reasons for failure and revealing the complex motivations that eventually led to the Limited Test Ban treaty.While previous books have focused on the policies of specific administrations, Tal is the first author to consider negotiations as an evolving phenomenon that preoccupied three presidents, from Truman to Kennedy. Drawing on extensive archival research, the author examines the profound dilemma faced by all three leaders: politically forced to engage in negotiations that they did not truly want to succeed. The United States, at that time, firmly believed that the nuclear arms race did not inevitably lead to war; to the contrary, nuclear weapons were the greatest guarantee that war would not happen.