Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (Clarendon Lectures in Economics)

The efficient markets hypothesis has been the central proposition in finance for nearly thirty years. It states that securities prices in financial markets must equal fundamental values, either because all investors are rational or because arbitrage eliminates pricing anomalies. This book describes an alternative approach to the study of financial markets: behavioral finance. This approach starts with an observation that the assumptions of investor rationality and perfect arbitrage are overwhelmingly contradicted by both psychological and institutional evidence. In actual financial markets, less than fully rational investors trade against arbitrageurs whose resources are limited by risk aversion, short horizons, and agency problems. The book presents models of such markets. These models explain the available financial data more accurately than the efficient markets hypothesis, and generate new predictions about security prices. By summarizing and expanding the research in behavioral finance, the book builds a new theoretical and empirical foundation for the economic analysis of real-world markets.

Business & Money

Shleifer, Andrei

Economics

Oxford University Press

A noted economist argues that the ubiquity of regulation can be explained by its greater efficiency when compared to litigation.
Government regulation is ubiquitous today in rich and middle-income countries―present in areas that range from workplace conditions to food processing to school curricula―although standard economic theories predict that it should be rather uncommon. In this book, Andrei Shleifer argues that the ubiquity of regulation can be explained not so much by the failure of markets as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. When courts are expensive, unpredictable, and biased, the public will seek alternatives to dispute resolution. The form this alternative has taken throughout the world is regulation.
The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators gathers Shleifer's influential writings on regulation and adds to them a substantial introductory essay in which Shleifer critiques the standard theories of economic regulation and proposes “the Enforcement Theory of Regulation,” which sees regulation as the more efficient strategy for social control of business. Subsequent chapters present the theoretical and empirical case against the efficiency of courts, make the historical and theoretical case for the comparative efficiency of regulation, and offer two empirical studies suggesting circumstances in which regulation might emerge as an efficient solution to social problems. Shleifer does not offer an unconditional endorsement of regulation and its expansion but rather argues that it is better than its alternatives, particularly litigation.
Contributors Nicola Gennaioli, Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Edward L. Glaeser, Simon Johnson, Casey B. Mulligan

The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators (Walras-Pareto Lectures)

Finance

Mit Pr

Honorable Mention in the category of Economics in the 1995 Professional/Scholarly Publishing Annual Awards Competition presented by the Association of American Publishers, Inc.

Privatizing Russia

Boycko, Maxim

Vishny, Robert

Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia

Recent commentators on Russia's economic reforms have almost uniformly declared them a disappointing and avoidable -- failure. In this book, two American scholars take a new and more balanced look at the country's attempts to build capitalism on the ruins of Soviet central planning. They show how and why the Russian reforms achieved remarkable breakthroughs in some areas but came undone in others. Unlike Eastern European countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic, to which it is often compared, Russia is a federal, ethnically diverse, industrial giant with an economy heavily oriented toward raw materials extraction. The political obstacles it faced in designing reforms were incomparably greater.Shleifer and Treisman tell how Russia's leaders, navigating in uncharted economic terrain, managed to find a path around some of these obstacles. In successful episodes, central reformers devised a strategy to win over some key opponents, while dividing and marginalizing others. Such political tactics made possible the rapid privatization of 14,000 state enterprises in 1992-1994 and the defeat of inflation in 1995. But failure to outmaneuver the new oligarchs and regional governors after 1996 undermined reformers' attempts to collect taxes and clean up the bureaucracy that has stifled business growth.Renewing a strain of analysis that runs from Machiavelli to Hirschman, the authors reach conclusions about political strategies that have important implications for other reformers. They draw on their extensive knowledge of the country and recent experience as advisors to Russian policymakers. Written in an accessible style, the book should appeal to economists, political scientists, policymakers, businesspeople, and all those interested in Russian politics or economics.

Treisman, Daniel

Privatizing Russia offers an inside look at one of the most remarkable reforms in recent history. Having started on the back burner of Russian politics in the fall of 1991, mass privatization was completed on July 1, 1994, with two thirds of the Russian industry privately owned, a rapidly rising stock market, and 40 million Russians owning company shares. The authors, all key participants in the reform effort, describe the events and the ideas driving privatization. They argue that successful reformers must recognize privatization as a process of depoliticizing firms in the face of massive opposition: making the firm responsive to market rather than political influences. The authors first review the economic theory of property rights, identifying the political influence on firms as the fundamental failure of property rights under socialism. They detail the process of coalition building and compromise that ultmately shaped privatization. The main elements of the Russian program -- corporatization, voucher use, and voucher auctions -- are described, as is the responsiveness of privatized firms to outside investors. Finally, the market values of privatized assets are assessed for indications of how much progress the country has made toward reforming its economy. In many respects, privatization has been a great success. Market concepts of property ownership and corporate management are shaking up Russian firms at a breathtaking pace, creating powerful economic and political stimuli for continuation of market reforms. At the same time, the authors caution, the political landscape remains treacherous as old-line politicians reluctantly cede their property rights and authority over firms.

Vishny, Robert W.

MIT Press]

A noted economist argues that the ubiquity of regulation can be explained by its greater efficiency when compared to litigation.
Government regulation is ubiquitous today in rich and middle-income countries―present in areas that range from workplace conditions to food processing to school curricula―although standard economic theories predict that it should be rather uncommon. In this book, Andrei Shleifer argues that the ubiquity of regulation can be explained not so much by the failure of markets as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. When courts are expensive, unpredictable, and biased, the public will seek alternatives to dispute resolution. The form this alternative has taken throughout the world is regulation.
The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators gathers Shleifer's influential writings on regulation and adds to them a substantial introductory essay in which Shleifer critiques the standard theories of economic regulation and proposes “the Enforcement Theory of Regulation,” which sees regulation as the more efficient strategy for social control of business. Subsequent chapters present the theoretical and empirical case against the efficiency of courts, make the historical and theoretical case for the comparative efficiency of regulation, and offer two empirical studies suggesting circumstances in which regulation might emerge as an efficient solution to social problems. Shleifer does not offer an unconditional endorsement of regulation and its expansion but rather argues that it is better than its alternatives, particularly litigation.
Contributors Nicola Gennaioli, Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Edward L. Glaeser, Simon Johnson, Casey B. Mulligan

Japanese Law in Context: Readings in Society, the Economy, and Politics (Harvard East Asian Monographs)

This is a wide-ranging selection of 130 readings in Japanese law. The essays, extracted from previously published books and articles, cover subjects including historical context, the civil law tradition, the legal services industry, dispute resolution, constitutional law, contracts, torts, criminal law, family law, employment law, corporate law, and economic regulation. This unique collection of readings is accompanied by the texts of the Japanese constitution and other basic laws.

Computers & Technology

West, Mark D.

Hendry, Joy

THOMPSON, Mark

Johnson, Chalmers

Young, Leslie

Fallows, James

Shapiro, Martin

Becker, Gary S.

Chira, Susan

Van Wolferen, Karel

BOK, DEREK

Merryman, John Henry

McCubbins, Mathew D.

Bayley, David H.

Weingast, Barry R.

Field, Norma

Bernstein, Lisa

Magee, Stephen P.

Brock, William A.

Dubro, Alec

Roe, Mark J.

Nakazato, Minoru

Lohr, Steve

Rohlen, Thomas P.

Murphy, Kevin M.

Pascale, Richard

Noble, Gregory W.

Upham, Frank K.

Bryant, Taimie L.

Krauss, Ellis S.

Smith, Thomas C.

Kidder, Robert L.

Crabb, Kelly

Miyazawa, Setsuo

Foote, Daniel H.

Miller, Geoffrey P.

Fukao, Mitsuhiro

Muramatsu, Michio

Smith, Robert Eliot

Eng, Robert Y.

Gilson, Ronald J.

Abegglen, James

Abowd, John M.

Amaya, Naohiro

Ames, Walter

Asanuma, Banri

Calvert, Randall L.

Coleman, Samuel

Edwards, Linda N.

Fukushima, Glen S.

Haley, John O.

Hamilton, Constance

Heftel, Chris

Henderson, Dan Fenno

Kaplan, David S.

Kaplan, Steven N.

Kawashima, Takeyosi

Minton, Bernadette A.

Moran, Mark J.

Muto, Shunko

Notehelfer, F. G.

Olson Jr., Mancur

Parkinson, Lorraine

Sheard, Paul

Sklar, Deborah

Smith, Malcolm D. H.

Stalk Jr, George

Takasugi, Shingo

Tanaka, Hideo

Weinstein, David E.

Wiswell, Ella

Yokoyama, Minoru

Yonemoto, Kazuhiro

Zaloom, E. Anthony

Software

Harvard University Asia Center

The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures

In many countries, public sector institutions impose heavy burdens on economic life: heavy and arbitrary taxes retard investment, regulations enrich corrupt bureaucrats, state firms consume national wealth, and the most talented people turn to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. As a consequence of such predatory policies--described in this book as the grabbing hand of the state--entrepreneurship lingers and economies stagnate.
The authors of this collection of essays describe many of these pathologies of a grabbing hand government, and examine their consequences for growth. The essays share a common viewpoint that political control of economic life is central to the many government failures that we observe. Fortunately, a correct diagnosis suggests the cures, including the best strategies of fighting corruption, privatization of state firms, and institutional building in the former socialist economies. Depoliticization of economic life emerges as the crucial theme of the appropriate reforms. The book describes the experiences with the grabbing hand government and its reform in medieval Europe, developing countries, transition economies, as well as today's United States.

Harvard University Press

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Shleifer, Andrei. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Shleifer, Andrei