: Since the mid-19th century, the United States has frequently employed the US Army on its southern border to perform various roles in support of the Nation—from outright war, to patrolling the border, to chasing bandits while securing persons and property on both sides of the border, and most recently to supporting civil law enforcement and antidrug efforts. Events since 9/11, such as the recent deployment of National Guard Soldiers to the Mexican border, are only the latest manifestation of this long tradition. This paper reviews the lengthy history of the US Army on the Mexican border and highlights recurring themes that are relevant to today’s ongoing border security mission.Between 1846 and 1921, the US Army carried out its security missions under a variety of hardships imposed by the massive length and ruggedness of the border. The shortage of soldiers to police the new and oft-disputed border also proved especially problematic. Mexican domestic politics and US-Mexican international relations greatly affected the Army’s operations. Since 1921, the Army’s role has been dramatically different, ranging from noninvolvement to varied forms of support to local, state, and Federal civilian agencies. The narrative brings to light these complexities and makes for compelling reading. The ongoing, post-9/11 debate over the military’s role in securing our Nation’s southern border makes this paper important reading for today’s Soldiers. While current and future missions will not mirror those of the past, the historical record is replete with insights and lessons learned from the Army’s past that are timely and relevant today. 

The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective: A Historical Perspective (Long War Series Occasional Paper)

History

Matthews, Matt M.

Americas

Government Printing Office

<p>Since the mid-19th century, the United States has frequently employed the US Army on its southern border to perform various roles in support of the Nation--from outright war, to patrolling the border, to chasing bandits while securing persons and property on both sides of the border, and most recently to supporting civil law enforcement and antidrug efforts. Events since 9/11, such as the recent deployment of National Guard Soldiers to the Mexican border, are only the latest manifestation of this long tradition. This 22nd Occasional Paper in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Long War Series, The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective, by CSI historian Matt M. Matthews, reviews the lengthy history of the US Army on the Mexican border and highlights recurring themes that are relevant to today's ongoing border security mission.</p>

The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective

Military

Independently published

We Were Caught Unprepared

lulu.com

Union Guerrillas of Civil War Kansas: Jayhawkers and Red Legs (Civil War Series)

Thomas, Paul A.

The History Press

<p>The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, "We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War" by CSI historian Mr. Matt M. Matthews. The outcome of the war that was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts throughout the world. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished. Matthews's historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. IN research this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field, many of whom had not previously been interviewed. The result is an insightful, comprehensive examination of the war. In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that terrorist groups around the world are capable of learning from, adapting to, and exploiting weaknesses in conventional military forces. Inasmuch as the US Army has focused almost exclusively on irregular warfare since 2001, the lessons offered in this analysis are particularly relevant. We believe that this study will be of great use to the US Army as it conducts current operations and prepares for an uncertain future in which potential enemies are watching and learning.~</p>

We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War: The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26

Institute, Combat Studies

Middle East

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

Beginning in 2009, the United States and many of its NATO-ISAF partners dramatically raised their levels of effort in Afghanistan. The "Afghan Surge," as it came to be known, was most evident in the number of additional US and allied troops that arrived in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010. Their mission was clear: To reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government, and to strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they could assume lead responsibility for their nation's future. For US Army units, the ways of creating stability and furthering the reach of the Afghan Government took several forms. First and foremost, US Soldiers executed complex and difficult offensive operations to seize territory that had often been held by insurgents for years. These combat actions were often complemented by civic action projects that were carried out together with US diplomats and development specialists. Additionally, US Soldiers formed close partnerships with Afghan Army and Police units to accelerate the growth of the Afghan security forces' capabilities. At the heart of all of these efforts were the men and women who served in front line units during what has become longest war in our Nation's history. The present volume, Vanguard of Valor II, offers six accounts of US Soldiers at the tip of the spear during the Afghan campaign. The Combat Studies Institute's Vanguard of Valor series is intended to document small unit actions in Afghanistan. These books play an equally important role by offering insights to Soldiers who may find themselves in the years ahead under similar conditions, whether in Afghanistan or in some other trouble land where they have been deployed to conduct the dangerous business of defending the national interest in a theater of war.

Vanguard of Valor Volume II: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan

Hymel, Kevin M.

Carlson, Ph. D., Anthony E.

Doidge, Michael J.

Gaitley, Scott J.

Wadle, Ph. D., Ryan D.

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