Ayn Rand and Altruism

Ayn Rand’s revolution in ethics was to present self-interest as a moral good. But revolutions are fiercely resisted by those proponents of the pre-existing order. Her elevation of selfishness as a virtue is often misunderstood as a ruthless pursuit of one’s own interests at the expense of others. In fact, Ayn Rand viewed benevolence as a positive good, as argued in Unrugged Individualism: The Selfish Basis of Benevolence (1996; rev. 2003), by David Kelley, Ph.D. “Benevolence means goodwill toward others,” Kelley explains. Further, "It is a positive attitude toward people in general. A desire for their wellbeing and for peaceful, cooperative relationships with them. It is contrasted with hostility, malice, envy or other forms of malevolence. It includes such traits as kindness, generosity, sympathy, charity and tolerance as elements." In Ayn Rand and Altruism, George H. Smith also calls attention to benevolence in Rand’s thinking. Indeed, Smith defends Rand’s rejection of altruism by contrasting it to benevolence. In this series of essays, originally published in Libertarianism.org, and republished by The Atlas Society with permission of the author, Smith begins by establishing that Rand’s definition of altruism–“The placing of others above self, of their interests above one’s own,”–is identical to the definition of altruism originated by Auguste Comte. The 19th-century French philosopher considered altruism the basis of morality. Rand considered altruism morality’s antithesis. Smith explains: "Rand’s analyses of altruism—including her claims about its moral, social, and political implications—are a virtual negative image of Comte’s defense of altruism. Thus, however much critics may dismiss Rand’s attacks on altruism as unjustified, her treatment of altruism, as discussed and defended by the man who originated the term and who defended altruism in more detail than any other philosopher, before or since, was remarkably on point."Smith emphasizes that Rand objected to altruism on the grounds that it is a duty. Benevolence is voluntary. The distinction has serious political consequences. Altruism becomes the moral basis of collectivism. It can be used malevolently to force individuals to sacrifice themselves. Smith’s analysis echoes that of Atlas Society Senior Scholar Stephen Hicks, Ph.D. In “Ellsworth Toohey’s Five Strategies of Altruism,” for example, Hicks argues that altruism, at best, is “a policy of collectivism.” At its extreme, Smith and Hicks agree that altruism “is about achieving power in order to rule,” and, worse, “getting power as a means purely to destroy.” Like Kelley and Hicks, Smith refutes the absurd claim that Ayn Rand, in rejecting altruism, advocated a cruel disregard for the wellbeing of others. Smith asserts that it is categorically incorrect to consider Ayn Rand someone who “defended ‘selfishness’ in the vulgar sense, according to which an egoist should show no concern for the welfare of others.” Indeed, Smith concludes after a sweeping and methodical examination of Rand’s position, “That was not her point at all.”