The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations

President Gerald R. Ford's 1975 decision to use force after the Cambodians seized the SS Mayaguez merchant ship is an important case study in national security decision making. It was the first test of the War Powers Act and the only time a president ever directly managed a crisis through the National Security Council. Significant differences existed between the military and the White House over the use of force during the crisis. While often viewed as the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Ford administration was mainly driven by concerns in Korea.The Mayaguez crisis is one of the best documented but least-understood crises in US history. Copious documentation, including declassified White House meeting minutes and notes from private conversations, has not produced a good, consensus explanation for US behavior. The event is still explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise in realpolitik, a political gambit to enhance Ford's domestic political fortunes, and a national spasm of violence arising from frustration over losing Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why it did contributes to equally confused explanations for US behavior. Even President Ford never understood the exact roles his two strongest advisors, Henry A. Kissinger and James R. Schlesinger, played during the crisis.