<p>President Gerald R. Ford's 1975 decision to use force after the Cambodians seized the SS Mayaguez merchant ship is an important case study in national security decision making. It was the first test of the War Powers Act and the only time a president ever directly managed a crisis through the National Security Council. Significant differences existed between the military and the White House over the use of force during the crisis. While often viewed as the last battle of the Vietnam War, the Ford administration was mainly driven by concerns in Korea.The Mayaguez crisis is one of the best documented but least-understood crises in US history. Copious documentation, including declassified White House meeting minutes and notes from private conversations, has not produced a good, consensus explanation for US behavior. The event is still explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise in realpolitik, a political gambit to enhance Ford's domestic political fortunes, and a national spasm of violence arising from frustration over losing Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why it did contributes to equally confused explanations for US behavior. Even President Ford never understood the exact roles his two strongest advisors, Henry A. Kissinger and James R. Schlesinger, played during the crisis.</p>

The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations

History

Lamb, Christopher

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Military

Independently published

<p>Faced with the need to establish unified command of US military forces in peacetime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 created an organizational directive, the "Outline Command Plan," which was the first in a series of documents known as Unified Command Plans. Approved by the President, the Unified Command Plan prescribes high-level command arrangements for operational forces on a global basis; its structure and the organizational philosophies that structure represents have had a major impact on US military operations in the post-World War II era. Thus, the History of the Unified Command Plan is a useful guide for those engaged in the development of current military policy and strategy as well as an important reference for students of US policy and strategy during the Cold War.The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-2012, covers the formulation of the plan, modifications, and periodic revisions. This volume includes four separate histories that were originally classified and an update covering the period from 1999 to 2012. The section describing the development of the Unified Command Plan between 1946 and 1977 was written by Dr. Robert J. Watson, Mr. James F. Schnabel, and Mr. Willard J. Webb and first published in declassified form in the late 1980s. The section covering the period from 1977 to 1983 was written by Dr. Ronald H. Cole and published in a classified version in 1985. The two sections covering 1983 through 1999 were prepared by Dr. Walter S. Poole. Dr. Edward J. Drea prepared the Overview and the update covering 1999 to 2012.This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US government departments and agencies and cleared for release. Although the text has been declassified, some of the cited sources remain classified. This volume is an official publication of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Chairman or of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.</p>

History of the Unified Command Plan 1946–2012

Watson, Robert

Drea, Edward

Schnabel, James

Webb, Willard

Cole, Ronald

Poole, Walter

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