American Policy Toward Laos

In "American Policy toward Laos" Martin E. Goldstein presents a brilliantly conceived, detailed analysis of American efforts in beleaguered Laos. Although he writes with scrupulous objectivity, Dr. Goldstein nevertheless presents facts that are certain to be controversial, and perhaps discomforting to many people. The author begins with a brief summary of American involvement in Indochina during World War II, after which he traces the tortuous path of American policy in Laos from 1954 to the present, with special emphasis on Washington's programs of economic and military aid. The author devotes much attention to the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Eisenhower administration's effort to erect a pro-Western bastion in Laos, the communist offensive in the summer of 1959, paratrooper Kong Le's coup, Washington's support for right-wing General Phoumi Nosavan's attempt to unseat Souvanna Phouma's government in the fall of 1960, President Kennedy's dramatic policy shift in favor of a neutral Laos, and the compromise settlement of 1961-62, which resulted in the creation of a coalition government in Vientiane. In a concluding section Dr. Goldstein describes American policy in Laos after 1962, and analyzes therein the relationships between Laos and the Vietnam War.