General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest

GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE ITS MEANING AND BASIC PRINCIPLES CONSTRUED IN TERMS OF INTEREST BY RALPH BARTON PERRY EDGAR PIERCE PROFESSOR OK PHILOSOPHY, EMERITUS HARVARD UNIVERSITY CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1950 COPYRIGHT, 1926, BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONDON GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS DEDICATED TO W. B. C.. AND C. J. C. PREFACE There are two kinds of philosophy that which cuts the Gordian knot, and that which attempts to untie it. The pres ent book aims to exemplify the latter rather than the former method, and if it should prove tedious, that fault will be due in part, at least, to the fact that untying is a less swift and dramatic performance than a blow of the sword. The philosophical method with which I should like to associate myself aims, furthermore, to bridge the gap between common-sense and science by refining the former, and by extending the latter. The results are not likely to recommend themselves either to common-sense or to science, being too technical to please the one and not sufficiently technical to please the other. The range of the present topic is so broad as to touch almost every popular conviction and overlap al most every province of science. Believing that philosophy must face the facts of life and nature, taking them as both the point of departure and the touchstone of truth, I am perpetually haunted by the accusing presence of some expert who possesses in this or that special field a mastery which I can never attain. I have escaped some blunders through the friendly assistance of my colleagues Professor Walter B. Cannon and Professor Clarence I. Lewis. It wouldhave taken an army of friends to have rid a book such as this of all blunders. But I know of no safe and prudent course for one who would be both an empiricist and a philosopher. He must run the risk of inaccuracy, or even court it, for the sake of that comprehensiveness of view, that tracing of connections and of contours, which is the only contribution to human wisdom which, as philosopher, he can hope to make. Even so, one can never be comprehensive enough. I realize that what I have here in some measure set in order VU viii PREFACE is adjoined on all sides by thickets abounding in monstrous doubts and difficulties. There are complications which I have not followed out, assumptions which I have not followed back, and afterthoughts which I can already anticipate. There are dawning ideas that one would feign take account of, new books that one would feign have read. Hence that weakness so common among authors, which leads them to express the pious hope not always shared by their readers that the present fragment will be completed in a future work, and there rounded into a perfect whole. Were it not for such a hope it is improbable that any philosophical work would reach the printer. For philosophy is never finished, it Is only suspended. The sequel of the present work has already received its title. It is to be called Realms of Value, and will deal with the varieties and types of that same value whose generic nature, whose meaning and basic principles, are herein set forth. Thus forewarned, but, I hope, not disheartened, my read ers are invited to join me in obeying the biblical injunction Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honor able, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things. RALPH BARTON PERRY CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS February, 1926. CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SCOPE i I. THE NEED FOR A GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE i i. Criticism versus Description I 2. The Special Sciences of Value 4 3. Miscellaneous Values of Every-day Life 9 II. THEORY OF VALUE IN RELATION TO MODERN TENDENCIES xi 4. Science Applied to Life II 5...