Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools

The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson—to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

Business & Money

Vives, Xavier

Economics

Mit Pr

The "oligopoly problem"―the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors―is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field―including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson―to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

MIT Press]

Information and Learning in Markets: The Impact of Market Microstructure

The ways financial analysts, traders, and other specialists use information and learn from each other are of fundamental importance to understanding how markets work and prices are set. This graduate-level textbook analyzes how markets aggregate information and examines the impacts of specific market arrangements--or microstructure--on the aggregation process and overall performance of financial markets. Xavier Vives bridges the gap between the two primary views of markets--informational efficiency and herding--and uses a coherent game-theoretic framework to bring together the latest results from the rational expectations and herding literatures.
 Vives emphasizes the consequences of market interaction and social learning for informational and economic efficiency. He looks closely at information aggregation mechanisms, progressing from simple to complex environments: from static to dynamic models; from competitive to strategic agents; and from simple market strategies such as noncontingent orders or quantities to complex ones like price contingent orders or demand schedules. Vives finds that contending theories like informational efficiency and herding build on the same principles of Bayesian decision making and that "irrational" agents are not needed to explain herding behavior, booms, and crashes. As this book shows, the microstructure of a market is the crucial factor in the informational efficiency of prices.
<ul>
 <li>Provides the most complete analysis of the ways markets aggregate information </li>
 <li>Bridges the gap between the rational expectations and herding literatures </li>
 <li>Includes exercises with solutions </li>
 <li>Serves both as a graduate textbook and a resource for researchers, including financial analysts </li>
 
</ul>

Princeton University Press

A distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks
Does too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies.
Xavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies.
Focusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.

Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Regulation and Competition Policy

Review\n"The book is worth reading from cover to cover. It is thoughtful, well written, lucidly surveys some well-known material, and brings useful insights using some of the tools of industrial organisation economics."---Geoffrey Wood, Central Banking Journal\n"Competition and Stability in Banking can be said to represent the best of available knowledge. . . . An impressive work of one of the leading economists in the field. It is first of all a (rather: the) new textbook on a Master or PhD level. Yet, it should also be mandatory reading to all economists (and lawyers) working in official or government agencies related to either banking regulation and supervision or competition."---Urs Birchler, Journal of Economics and Statistics\nA distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks\nDoes too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies.\nXavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies.\nFocusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.

Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

Cambridge University Press

The European banking industry is in a state of turmoil. The pace of mergers and acquisitions has accelerated across different banking sectors and within the same sector. At the same time, the demise of banks already in trouble has accelerated. While it is helpful to examine the U.S. experience in recent decades, the European situation is complicated by the presence of 'nationally segmented' markets. This report first analyzes what lies behind the historic segmentation of EU financial markets because a clear view about these issues is needed to predict the changes that EMU will bring about. The Monetary Union confronts these changes with no clear strategy for regulation and prudential supervision and the ECB claims it will not be involved in those activities--they will remain the responsibility of national governments and national central banks. The authors examine the policy implications of these changes and propose measures to address the problems that may be encountered.

The Future of European Banking: Monitoring European Integration 9

Danthine, Jean-Pierre

Giavazzi, Francesco

Von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig

Centre for Economic Policy Research

Addressed to academics and European decisionmakers in the private sector and policy communities at both the national and EU level, this report - which focuses on the deregulation of the European banking system - aims to influence thinking on these issues and contribute to the policy debate.

European Airlines (Monitoring European Deregulation)

et.al.

Brookings Institution,U.S.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Vives, Xavier. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Vives, Xavier

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Vives, Xavier. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools

Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools

Information and Learning in Markets: The Impact of Market Microstructure

Information and Learning in Markets: The Impact of Market Microstructure

Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Regulation and Competition Policy

Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Regulation and Competition Policy

Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

The Future of European Banking: Monitoring European Integration 9

European Airlines (Monitoring European Deregulation)