Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commander’s intent. The use of mission tactics allowed subordinate commanders like Crown Prince Frederick Karl, Gen. Konstantin von Alvensleben, and Gen. Karl von Steinmetz to interpret how best to achieve the commander’s intent based upon their understanding of the tactical situation. The Prussian use of decentralized command during the Franco-Prussian War acknowledged the risk inherent in this system of command. Despite what modern military theorists often write, Auftragstaktik and mission command are not synonymous terms. Most authors ignore the historical environment that the Prussian military operated in during the Franco-Prussian War. This book examines the influence of the Prussian concept of Auftragstaktik on the modern US Army notion of mission command as defined within the published doctrine. It utilizes archival records and pertinent published histories from the August 1870 battles on the Franco-Prussian frontier, Moltke’s 1869 Instructions for Large Unit Commanders, as well as writings from the 1980s to describe the influence of Prussian system on the modern concept of mission command.

Auftragstaktik: The Basis for Modern Military Command? (Defense)

United States Army Command and General Staff College

History

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

Three Capitals for Two States: Analysis of Jerusalem’s Sovereignty and Perspectives

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

This book explores two major U.S. operations and the reaction to one enemy offensive, in order to explore evidence of U.S. operational art in Vietnam. For the purpose of this study, the operational level is identified as the corps headquarters responsible for nesting Military Assistance Command–Vietnam’s ( MACV) military guidance, the strategic direction issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national government’s aims with the tactical maneuver of subordinate divisions and battalions. During the Vietnam War, the Field Force served as the equivalent of the corps headquarters. The three case studies analyzed are all drawn from II Field Force during the period 1967 to 1971. These case studies are OPERATION CEDAR FALLS/ JUNCTION CITY (1967), the 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia under OPERATION TOAN THANG, and II Field Force’s reaction to the Tet offensive (1968). Through the analysis of the case studies, the question of operational art existing at the corps level during the Vietnam War is addressed, as is the identification of successful or unsuccessful leadership and staff practices faced in an asymmetric conflict.

Corps Level Operational Art in Vietnam: A Study of II Field Force Commanders During Major Named Operations

Military

This book examines Chinese warfare and suggests that three and a half millennia of Chinese military history have produced a distinctive and enduring Chinese way of war. While the art and science of war in China have evolved considerably throughout its history, the characteristics and philosophies of its style of warfare contain some propensities that endure from antiquity to the present. They are: The Chinese military orientation focuses more on the strategic and operational levels of war than the tactical. The Chinese prefer strategic maneuver warfare to attritional or other forms of warfare. Chinese warfare emphasizes the importance of shaping operations, the arrangement of the conditions of the war, campaign, or battlefield in one’s favor before initiating combat. Finally, deception and unorthodox warfare play a leading role in Chinese martial philosophy and conduct of war. These four propensities of the Chinese way of war are general trends that emerge when the entire span of Chinese warfare is broadly considered. Rooted in the philosophy and theories of the great military classics of ancient Chinese, these propensities provide continuities in the warfighting styles, traditions, and preferences of Chinese armies throughout history. While none of the four propensities of Chinese warfare are practiced by China alone, when aggregated they form a broad approach to warfighting that is unlike that of any other country in the world. The distinctiveness of the Chinese way of war is a product of China’s unique cultural traditions, religious and social philosophies, and historical evolution.

From Red Cliffs to Chosin: The Chinese Way of War

Concentrating on the Enemy: The Transformation Under-fire of Former Regime Militias into Post-Conflict Guerrillas

The Transformation of the Army of the Potomac Staff From 1862-1864

Americas

<p>National militaries extend operational reach through the use of improved lines of communication and basing. Evidence of Roman roads and fortifications in Gaul reveals a history of physical infrastructure extending operational reach in order to increase the Roman Army’s chance of success. Three case studies provide a framework for this study. First, Caesar’s legions used Gallic folkways to fight in Gaul from 58-50 BC. Second, the Romans projected all forces for the invasion of Britain over roads in Gaul in 43 AD. Third, from 19 BC until the fall of Rome in the fifth century AD, along the Germanic frontier. All three periods of Roman operations in Gaul demonstrate the interplay of the components of operational reach. Poor roads and basing restricted Caesar’s potential operational reach in Gaul. The deployment toward Britain over Roman roads in Gaul succeeded due to significant increases in infrastructure. On the static frontiers of the Roman empire, the army greatly reduced the potential momentum of its forces as a trade-off for greater endurance and protection.</p>

Roman Roads in Gaul: How Lines of Communication and Basing Support Operational Reach

Ancient Civilizations

Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri enticed tens of thousands of Muslims from around the world to travel to Afghanistan, swear allegiance to bin Laden and the cause of Al Qaeda, fight and even die for that cause. Bin Laden united faithful Muslims under his ideological banner by making relevant the historical context of authentic Islam and promoting jihad not only as a religious obligation, but a legally sanctioned and moral responsibility of every good and true Muslim. This monograph explains Al Qaeda's narrative as a jihadist organization that currently poses the greatest threat to United States and Western interests around the world. The first section offers an explanation of terms that people commonly use to describe an enemy they may not fully understand – these terms include fundamentalist, extremist, Salafi and jihadi. The next section provides a historical overview of the threat the United States faces in Afghanistan today. After explaining the roots of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the paper details the organization's ideology and goals as well as the historical basis for this ideology, reaching back to the Prophet Muhammad and the origins of Islam. The paper argues that in order to defeat bin Laden and Al Qaeda, it is necessary to understand the roots of Al Qaeda's Islamic narrative and the environmental context that allowed these concepts to gain such a following. By understanding the true nature of the threat, United States political and military leaders will be better able to formulate plans and develop operations that counter the effectiveness of Al Qaeda's messages and provide alternatives for those currently engaged in jihad against America.

Toward Greater Understanding: The Jihadist Ideology of Al Qaeda

Hill Street Blues Post Conflict: Host Nation Police Advisor

Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate. Comments from returning soldiers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain. This monograph reviews the small arms capability of the infantry squad from World War I to present. It then discusses current shortfalls with cartridge lethality, weapons and optics configurations, the squad designated marksman concept and finally the rifle qualification course. Potential solutions in each of these areas are discussed.

Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer

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