Leadership is not easy, and there is no magic recipe for successful leadership. That is why there are so many business books about leaders and leadership traits. In the military, we focus on leader development at the very beginning of service, in basic training, and at pre-commissioning . . . every Soldier is a leader. While the principles of tactical leadership are not always easy to do and are certainly aspirational, they are fundamental in nature; provide clear vision and intent, develop mutual understanding and trust, build cohesive teams that work together to achieve decisive results in line with our professional ethic, and provide orders and guidance that develop initiative and focus on what to do and for what purpose, rather than emphasizing the how.These concepts also apply at more senior levels; however, the challenges at the strategic-enterprise level are very different. The Army inherently knew this but did not formally establish a framework for leadership and command above the direct, tactical level until 1987 with the publication of FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. The transition from tactical to operational leadership is far easier than the transition to strategic leadership. That is why the transition to strategic leadership is central to our efforts at the U.S. Army War College, and why we strive to "produce strategic leaders and ideas invaluable to the Army, the Joint Force, and the Nation." This fourth edition of the Strategic Leadership Primer is designed to facilitate that transition for every student.Many leaders who are successful in early-mid career fail to make the second transition to the enterprise level effectively. Part of their struggle is typically tied to a lack of understanding of the strategic competitive environment where problems are far more complex and previous experiences, while important, are insufficient to solve multi-domain, joint warfighting level challenges. This environment often rewards clarity and punishes those who wait for certainty.

Strategic Leadership Primer for Senior Leaders: Fourth Edition

Politics & Social Sciences

U.S. Army War College Press

Politics & Government

Independently published

The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army’s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country’s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to “surge” additional forces to Iraq, and reviews the conduct of the “surge” and its aftermath.This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of handpicked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, represents the U.S. Government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal: 2007-2011

History

Rayburn, Joel

Sobchak, Frank

Military

An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations

nielsen,suzanne

The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army's initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country's slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to "surge" additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the "surge" and its aftermath in the second volume.This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of handpicked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, represents the U.S. Government's longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War: Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

The current international security environment is characterized by unprecedented uncertainty. In the Asia-Pacific, our allies adjust to China’s rise and hedge against instability coming from North Korea. In the greater Middle East, the Syrian civil war draws in powerful state and nonstate actors, Iran’s weapons program worries its neighbors, the Arab Spring continues its uncertain course, and we see a growing Sunni-Shia split throughout the region. In Europe, the need for a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance has become clear as nations along Russia’s periphery reevaluate their strategic alignments in the wake of the situation in Crimea. In Africa, weak states with ethnic and religious tensions set conditions for terrorist groups to operate with near impunity. It is in this uncertain and unstable world that U.S. military forces will operate for the foreseeable future. These security challenges require us to remain the most highly-trained and professional All-Volunteer land force in the world, uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive Landpower to the Joint Force, and ready to perform the range of military operations in support of combatant commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats.

American Grand Strategy and the Future of U.S. Landpower

Strategic Studies Institute

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

This book is comprised of four main sections: • Characterization. This section provides the notional foundation necessary to avoid any devolution of the analysis to mere semantic arguments.It presents how cyberspace is defined and characterized for this discussion, as well as how this compares to existing concepts of the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space. Also, it identifies some of the unique technical challenges that the cyberspace domain may introduce into the process of distinguishing acts of war. • Assessment Criteria. This section explores the dejure and the defacto issues involved with assaying cyber incidents to determine if they represent aggression and possible use of force; and,if so, to what degree? It reviews the traditional legal frameworks surrounding military action to include the United Nations (UN) Charter and the Law of Armed Conflict. It also examines how these compare to the recently published Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. From these sources, it proposes a cyberspace incident assessment methodology. • Policy Considerations. Having identified viable criteria to aid with the assessment of cyber-space incidents, this section looks at the policy considerations associated with applying such principles. First, it examines the relevant U.S. strategies; next, it investigates the strategies of other key countries and international organizations and how they compare to U.S. tenets; and finally,it evaluates how non state actors may affect U.S. deliberations. • Courses of Action. This section examines the influences that course of action development and implementation may have on the assessment of cyberspace incidents. It first looks at the President’s role as the primary decision maker in U.S. national matters regarding cyber-space. It then surveys key influences affecting subordinate decision makers and their staffs that may be advising the Commander-in-Chief: reliable situational awareness, global and domestic environment considerations, and options and their related risks and potential consequences. Any reader expecting a perfect solution for this conundrum will be disappointed, as the examination is more about the journey than the destination. In the end, many of the challenges with this issue are common with those of the traditional domains; however, the complex and dynamic character of the cyberspace domain introduces unique vexations for senior policymakers and decision makers. The conclusion of this book includes recommendations that the author hopes will aid in the positive evolution toward a better understanding and mitigation of the fog and friction surrounding the distinction of acts of war in cyberspace.

Distinguishing Acts of War in Cyberspace: Assessment Criteria, Policy Considerations, and Response Implications

Russia and the Caspian Sea: Projecting Power or Competing for Influence?

The United States Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development have interacted for 50 years to advance national security interests. With origins in the Marshall Plan, and through joint efforts in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the two have developed policies, liaison systems, and joint programming to advance practical coordination. After closely-combined defense, diplomatic and developmental (3D) efforts, USAID and DOD have never appreciated each other's capabilities better. Despite this, significant challenges exist which impede sustained coordination, including resource imbalances, conceptual gaps, and personality-based rather than institutional relationships. As war efforts conclude, is a window of time closing on dev-mil coordination? What are the implications for unity of effort between military and development actors? This book analyses the history, policies, coordination structures, and experiences of USAID and DOD interaction; identifies trends and challenges; and recommends continued interagency engagement, particularly through joint planning, field programming and broader staff exchanges.

USAID & DOD: Analysis and Recommendations to Enhance Development-Military Cooperation

La Familia Michoacana, also known as La Familia, is one of the most bizarre and deadly cartels in the world. Its Bible-pounding leaders recruit young people from rehabilitation centers, insist that they throw off their dependence on alcohol, drugs, and other addictive substances, and, once clean, apply to join their organization. The novitiates must submit themselves to 2 months of brainwashing that includes scripture readings, exposure to motivational speakers, and long periods of silence and meditation. Upon completing their “instruction,” they may become couriers, lookouts, or drivers. Those who show an aptitude for violence are taken in groups of 40 to a wilderness area known as the Jesús del Monte. There, they are directed to shoot, butcher, and cook 15 victims to demonstrate that they are neither squeamish about killing innocents nor repulsed by handling bloody body parts. The leaders of La Familia—known as ”El Chango” (José de Jesús Méndez Vargas) and “El Chayo” (Nazario Moreno González) assure those who successfully complete this exercise that they are prepared to do the Lord’s work—that is, safeguarding women, combatting competing cartels, and preventing the local sale of drugs.

La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security

The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 left behind a set of unresolved problems in the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Federal Government in Baghdad—notably relating to the disputed boundaries of the KRG, and the extent of its autonomy. Tensions have since been compounded by the discovery of significant quantities of oil and gas in the KRG area, and Erbil’s pursuit of an energy policy independent of and in opposition to Baghdad. Turkey, uneasy with the increasingly sectarian and authoritarian flavor of the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, has since moved closer to the KRG, not least with respect to energy issues. This has deepened Turkish-Iraqi tensions still further. Added to the mix is the increasingly sectarian stand-off in the region as a whole, in large measure as a consequence of Syrian developments, which has further pitted Ankara against Baghdad and its ally, Iran; and the emergence of a bid for autonomy by Syria’s Kurds, which has complicated the stance of both Ankara and Erbil towards Syria and towards each other. Washington is in danger of being left behind by the fast-paced events in the region, while the ethnic Kurds of the region may be approaching a decisive moment in their long struggle for self-determination.

Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations After The U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq: Putting The Kurds On The Map?

Travel

Asia

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