Crisis at Sea is the first comprehensive history of the United States Navy in European waters during World War I. Drawing on vast American, British, German, French, and Italian sources, the author presents the U.S. Naval experience as America moved into the modern age of naval warfare. Not limited to an operations account of naval battles and strategies, this volume—the second in a series—examines diplomatic policies, cabinet decisions, logistics, the home front, support systems, and shipbuilding to illustrate the complexity and enormity of America’s naval participation in World War I. This is a thorough treatment of not only the events but also the personalities of the war, with particular attention to the difficulties they faced. The book reveals penetrating insights into the United States’ relations in the world, the nation’s unpreparedness for such a war, the limits imposed on the Navy by the cabinet, and the unexpected conclusion to the war. Much of the author’s exhaustive research is new, such as the use of French official documents and British recollections of the American ships and sailors. This book will be the standard reference volume for libraries and serious scholars with a special interest in World War I and in the history of warfare.

Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology)

History

Still, Jr., William N.

Military

University Press of Florida

In Why the South Lost the Civil War, four historians considered the dominant explanations of southern defeat. At end, the authors found that states' rights disputes, the Union blockade, and inadequate southern forces did not fully account for the surrender. Rather, they concluded, the South lacked the will to win. Its strength sapped by a faltering Confederate nationalism and weakened by a peculiar brand of evangelical Protestantism, the South withdrew from a war not yet lost on the field of battle.
Roughly one-half the size of its parent study, The Elements of Confederate Defeat retains all the essential arguments of the earlier edition, forming for the student a book that at once follows the events of the war and presents the major interpretations of its outcome in the South.

The Elements of Confederate Defeat: Nationalism, War Aims, and Religion

HATTAWAY, HERMAN

Beringer, Richard E.

Jones, Archer

Americas

University of Georgia Press

In this widely heralded book first published in 1986, four historians consider the popularly held explanations for southern defeat―state-rights disputes, inadequate military supply and strategy, and the Union blockade―undergirding their discussion with a chronological account of the war's progress. In the end, the authors find that the South lacked the will to win, that weak Confederate nationalism and the strength of a peculiar brand of evangelical Protestantism sapped the South's ability to continue a war that was not yet lost on the field.

Why the South Lost the Civil War (Brown Thrasher Books)

IRON AFLOAT: THE STORY OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMORCLADS

Univ. of South Carolina Press

In Confederate Shipbuilding, William N. Still Jr. cogently demonstrates the real grounds for the Confederacy's failure to build a successful navy. The South's major problems with shipbuilding concerned facilities, materials, and labor. To each of these subjects the author devotes a chapter, and then concludes by joining these problems to the larger issues of the Civil War. Still argues that the Confederate navy's difficulties in construction were mainly caused by military, geographic, and political factors―not by lack of resources or the inefficiency of Southern naval officers. Problems caused by internal dissension―states' rights quarrels and interservice rivalries―were characteristic of other theaters of the war; yet, Still shows, the navy was particularly affected, being the stepchild of a war department that was land-minded. This careful study therefore contributes not only to our understanding of the failure of the Southern shipbuilding program, but also to our knowledge of the reasons for the downfall of the Confederate States of America.

Confederate Shipbuilding (Studies in Maritime History)

University of South Carolina Press

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Iron Afloat (Studies in Maritime History)

Still, William

This classic study examines the deployment of U.S. naval vessels in European and Near Eastern waters from the end of the Civil War until the United States declared war in April 1917. Initially these ships were employed to visit various ports from the Baltic Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and Constantinople (today Istanbul), for the primary purpose of showing the flag. From the 1890s on, most of the need for the presence of the American warships occurred in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Unrest in the Ottoman Empire and particularly the Muslim hostility and threats to Armenians led to calls for protection. This would continue into the years of World War I. In 1905, the Navy Department ended the permanent stationing of a squadron in European waters.
From then until the U.S. declaration of war in 1917, individual ships, detached units, and special squadrons were at times deployed in European waters. In 1908, the converted yacht Scorpion was sent as station ship (stationnaire) to Constantinople where she would remain, operating in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea until 1928. Upon the outbreak of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson ordered cruisers to northern European waters and the Mediterranean to protect American interests. These warships, however, did more than protect American interests. They would evacuate thousands of refugees, American tourists, Armenians, Jews, and Italians after Italy entered the conflict on the side of the Allies.

American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917

Naval_Institute_Press

Victory Without Peace concentrates on the U.S. Navy in European and Near Eastern waters during the post-World War I era. As participants in the Versailles peace negotiations, the Navy was charged with executing the naval terms of the Armistice as well as preserving stability and peace. U.S. warships were deploying into the Near East, Baltic, Adriatic, and Northern Europe, while simultaneously withdrawing its demobilized forces from European waters. This signifies the first time the U.S. Navy contributed to peacetime efforts, setting a precedent continues today.Conversely, Congressional appropriations handicapped this deployment by demobilization, general naval policy and postwar personnel, and operating funds reductions. Though reluctant to allocate postwar assets into seemingly unimportant European and Near Eastern waters, the Navy was pressured by the State Department and the American Relief Administration's leader, Herbert Hoover, to deploy necessary forces. Most of these were withdrawn by 1924 and the European Station assumed the traditional policy of showing the flag.

Victory Without Peace: The United States Navy in European Waters, 1919-1924 (Studies in Naval History and Sea Power)

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