Orders of Battle for the world's armies, from Abkhazia to Zimbabwe. The material comes from Orbat.info's global intelligence network, and is being made available to the pubic for the first time.

Concise World Armies 2005

Science & Math

Rikhye, Ravi

Borenstein, Richard B

Smith, Larry J.

Technology

General Data LLC

The most comprehensive listing of ground orders of battle for the world's armies publicaly available, at a bargain price that is less than 10% that for similiar, but less detailed, publications.

Concise World Armies 2006

Engineering & Transportation

Engineering

The analysis asks one question and has one answer: Can India fight a two-front war against China and Pakistan? The answer is it cannot. Because of the China-Pakistan alliance, we cannot fight even a one-front war: engaging in a war with either adversary runs the risk of weakening the other front, leaving it open to exploitation. The solution, fortunately, is straightforward: build a 2-front war capability. The next problem is equally straightforward: The Government of India is determined not to spend money on defense. Today spending is down to 1.56% of GDP, lower even than in 1962. And we know how that ended. It takes little imagination to foresee what would have happened if 1962 had become 2-front: Pakistan would have walked over Punjab, perhaps all the way to Delhi, and we would have lost Kashmir too. If we chose to defend Punjab, we would have lost the North East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal. If we tried to defend both fronts, we would have lost both. For a strong defensive posture, we need to spend the 3 - 3.5% of GDP we spent 1963-1990, both to modernize and to raise eight more divisions that is the minimum needed. To negotiate from strength, we need 4%+ and to recover our lost territories we need 6%. Our spending is 1.6% of GDP, lower even than the 1.9% of 1962. Theoretically, India can fight a 2-front war on land. It can defend its "Near Seas": The Bay of Bengal, the East Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Munnar (waters between India and Sri Lanka), and the Andaman Sea. The Air Force continues deteriorating, it can fight a 1-front war but not two. There are, however, severe problems on the ground. This should not be the situation on the face of it. China can comfortably deploy 10 divisions, Pakistan has 25, including one it calls Force Command Northern Areas, and two it calls "Corps Reserve." That is 35 versus India's 38. The matter is, however, more complex than a simple division count. First, China has ended its policy of assigning formations permanently to a theatre for regional defense. Its entire ground force, including airborne troops under the air force and marine brigades under the navy, amount to 90 brigade groups that are being trained to fight in any theatre. Further, China still retains at least six divisions. We don't know yet if they will remain as divisions; nonetheless, it is best to include the, giving China 108 brigades. Still further, China retains many reserve brigades. These, while unable to assume a first-line role, can provide defense in depth, follow-up forces, and cover secondary sectors. Next, because of the Government of India's etched-in-stone policy that ever meter of ground must be held, we need more brigades to divisions to defend than Pakistan does. This is discussed in detail. For now, accept that India needs one more division for each of XV, XVI, IX, XI, and XII Corps, and three more for Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarakhand. The Northeast is reasonably defended thanks to the four new divisions we raised. Should that not suffice for a 2-front defense, 46 divisions versus China-Pakistan's 38? Yes - but defense, not for offensive war. Without an offensive capability, we can stabilize our fronts with 29 divisions against Pakistan and 14 against China, which will leave both free to attack again. This book argues that for a proper 2-front defensive capability, India immediately needs eight more divisions, two corps HQs, and 12 new brigades. The remaining twelve brigades will come from existing formations. Immediately does not mean spread over 10-years in the future. It means the authorization and funding must be made now, and the job completed in 3-years.

Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

Independently published

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Volume 3: Offensives and Counteroffensives in the South-West (Asia@War)

History

Asia

Helion and Company

In 1947, India and Pakistan were partitioned by their former colonial ruler, Great Britain. A job that should have taken ten-years was done in a few months. Britain, drained by two world wars in 40-years, no longer had the will or the money to guide the subcontinent to a peaceful partition by consensus. More importantly, the subcontinent was impatient for Britain's departure. The British left in haste, leaving unresolved the issue of Kashmir. This triggered five wars between the new states: 1947-48, 1965, 1971, 1999 and continuing insurgency/counterinsurgency that began in 1987. Two other potential wars were narrowly averted in 1987-88 and 2001-02, and a limited one fought in 1999. Since the basic issue remains unresolved, the next war may be only a matter of time.In 1970, East Pakistan voted for independence and armed rebellion. A quick and nasty counterinsurgency suppressed the rebellion. India, seizing the chance to change the balance of power, first backed East Pakistan, then on 21 and 22 November 1971 invaded with eight divisions. India planned also to attack West Pakistan to recover Kashmir, but at the last moment the offensive was called off due to Soviet pressure. Pakistan attacked pre-emptively, and an all-out war resulted. East Pakistan was overrun by India on 16 December; the US and Soviet forced a ceasefire in the West only a day later. For the first time in 800 years, a predominantly Hindu army defeated a Muslim army.Through extensive use of official records and participant recollections, rare photography and authentic colour profiles, Ravi Rikhye tells the captivating story of the biggest military conflict fought between India and Pakistan to date, and the war that resulted in emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971: Volume 1 - Indian Military Intervention in East Pakistan (Asia@War)

Middle East

In 1947, India and Pakistan were partitioned by their former colonial ruler, Great Britain. A job that should have taken ten-years was done in a few months. Britain, drained by two world wars in 40-years no longer had the will or the money to guide the subcontinent to a peaceful partition by consensus. More importantly, the subcontinent was impatient for Britain's departure. The British left in haste, leaving unresolved the issue of Kashmir. This triggered a number of wars between the new states: 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and a continuing insurgency/counterinsurgency that began in 1987. Two other potential wars were narrowly averted in 1987-88 and 2001-02, and a further limited war was fought in 1999. Since the basic issue remains unresolved, the next war may be only a matter of time.Late in the afternoon of 3 December 1971, in an attempt to distract New Delhi from developments in its eastern wing, Pakistan initiated hostilities with India by flying a series of air strikes against the forward air bases of the Indian Air force. Thus began the 'official' part of the India-Pakistan War of 1971, a bitter conventional war of the highest intensity in the history of the two countries since their independence. During the following weeks, a series of pitched battles took place as the two parties began exchanging blows almost everywhere along their 2,000-kilometre long mutual borders. By 16 December, and rather suddenly, the conflict was over: once East Pakistan had been overrun by India, Islamabad had no incentive to continue fighting a war it could not possibly win.Through the extensive use of official records and participant recollections, rare photography and authentic color profiles, Ravi Rikhye tells the captivating story of the biggest military conflict fought between India and Pakistan to date, and the war that resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971: Volume 2 - Showdown in the North-West (Asia@War)

On Indian military strategic history, 1947-1971.

War That Never Was: The Story of India's Strategic Failures

Military

South Asia Books

Militarization of Mother India

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Books by Rikhye, Ravi