Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Allied nations often stop each other from going to war. Some countries even form alliances with the specific intent of restraining another power and thereby preventing war. Furthermore, restraint often becomes an issue in existing alliances as one ally wants to start a war, launch a military intervention, or pursue some other risky military policy while the other ally balks. In Warring Friends, Jeremy Pressman draws on and critiques realist, normative, and institutionalist understandings of how alliance decisions are made.Alliance restraint often has a role to play both in the genesis of alliances and in their continuation. As this book demonstrates, an external power can apply the brakes to an incipient conflict, and even unheeded advice can aid in clarifying national goals. The power differentials between allies in these partnerships are influenced by leadership unity, deception, policy substitutes, and national security priorities. Recent controversy over the complicated relationship between the U.S. and Israeli governments―especially in regard to military and security concerns―is a reminder that the alliance has never been easy or straightforward.Pressman highlights multiple episodes during which the United States attempted to restrain Israel's military policies: Israeli nuclear proliferation during the Kennedy Administration; the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; preventing an Israeli preemptive attack in 1973; a small Israeli operation in Lebanon in 1977; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; and Israeli action during the Gulf War of 1991. As Pressman shows, U.S. initiatives were successful only in 1973, 1977, and 1991, and tensions have flared up again recently as a result of Israeli arms sales to China.Pressman also illuminates aspects of the Anglo-American special relationship as revealed in several cases: British nonintervention in Iran in 1951; U.S. nonintervention in Indochina in 1954; U.S. commitments to Taiwan that Britain opposed, 1954-1955; and British intervention and then withdrawal during the Suez War of 1956. These historical examples go far to explain the context within which the Blair administration failed to prevent the U.S. government from pursuing war in Iraq at a time of unprecedented American power.

History

Pressman, Jeremy

Americas

Cornell University Press

Allied nations often stop each other from going to war. Some countries even form alliances with the specific intent of restraining another power and thereby preventing war. Furthermore, restraint often becomes an issue in existing alliances as one ally wants to start a war, launch a military intervention, or pursue some other risky military policy while the other ally balks. In Warring Friends, Jeremy Pressman draws on and critiques realist, normative, and institutionalist understandings of how alliance decisions are made.
Alliance restraint often has a role to play both in the genesis of alliances and in their continuation. As this book demonstrates, an external power can apply the brakes to an incipient conflict, and even unheeded advice can aid in clarifying national goals. The power differentials between allies in these partnerships are influenced by leadership unity, deception, policy substitutes, and national security priorities.
Recent controversy over the complicated relationship between the U.S. and Israeli governments―especially in regard to military and security concerns―is a reminder that the alliance has never been easy or straightforward. Pressman highlights multiple episodes during which the United States attempted to restrain Israel's military policies: Israeli nuclear proliferation during the Kennedy Administration; the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; preventing an Israeli preemptive attack in 1973; a small Israeli operation in Lebanon in 1977; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; and Israeli action during the Gulf War of 1991. As Pressman shows, U.S. initiatives were successful only in 1973, 1977, and 1991, and tensions have flared up again recently as a result of Israeli arms sales to China.
Pressman also illuminates aspects of the Anglo-American special relationship as revealed in several cases: British nonintervention in Iran in 1951; U.S. nonintervention in Indochina in 1954; U.S. commitments to Taiwan that Britain opposed, 1954-1955; and British intervention and then withdrawal during the Suez War of 1956. These historical examples go far to explain the context within which the Blair administration failed to prevent the U.S. government from pursuing war in Iraq at a time of unprecedented American power.

Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace

The Arab-Israeli peace process has reached a point of no return. Structural as well as ideological obstacles remain to a comprehensive Middle East peace--including major asymmetries between the parties. The two most critical challenges concern violent opposition in the Muslim world and Israel to the peace process and continuing instability in the Persian Gulf. Until Iraq and Iran are reintegrated into a more stable Gulf security system, their behavior poses a constant threat to the region and undermines the potential benefits of an Arab-Israeli peace. The study reviews the progress made toward peace between 1991 and 1995 and the dramatic setbacks that occurred in 1996. It also assesses the challenges ahead and provides a country-by-country analysis of criticisms of the peace process.

Politics & Social Sciences

Kemp, Geoffrey

Sociology

Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace

This work argues that calculating an equitable military balance between Israel and its Arab neighbours cannot be done unless both sides are prepared to accept the principle of asymmetric reciprocity - where Israel and Arabs agree to make mutual but unequal concessions to achieve peace.

Politics & Government

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

In this lucid and timely new book, Jeremy Pressman demonstrates that the default use of military force on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict has prevented its peaceful resolution. Whether called deterrence or war, armed struggle or terrorism, the history of the conflict reveals that violence has been counterproductive. Drawing on historical evidence from the 1950s to the present, The sword is not enough pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. Violence weakens the security situation, bolsters adversaries, and, especially in the case of Palestine, has sabotaged political aims. Studiously impartial and accessibly written, this book shows us that diplomacy is the only answer.

The sword is not enough: Arabs, Israelis, and the limits of military force

Reference

Manchester University Press

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Books by Pressman, Jeremy

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Pressman, Jeremy. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace

Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace

The sword is not enough: Arabs, Israelis, and the limits of military force