Ultra intelligence derived from decryption of high-level German military communications nets provided the Allied forces defending Crete with extraordinary warning of the impending German air assault in May 1941. Despite the advantage of this warning, the Allies' defense of Crete was unsuccessful. Examination of the preparations for the battle and of the available intelligence reveals shortcomings in the linkage between intelligence and operations which reduced the battlefield commander's ability to effectively use the intelligence provided to him. Five intelligence essons learned fra the Battle for Crete are the need to plan to ensure continuous availability of intelligence throughout an operation, the criticality of communications to intelligence, the need for the ccomander to understand intelligence to effectively use it, the problems associated with source protection and the inevitability of ambiguity in intelligence.

Intelligence Lessons Learned from the Battle for Crete 1941: (Enhanced with Text Analytics by PageKicker)

History

PageKicker Robot Fast Hans

Perlberg, Lt. Commander Miriam

Military

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

Public domain history of US airborne and airlift operations during WW2 enhanced by text analytics from PageKicker including an automatic summary, dramatis personae, gazetteer, readability assessment, and word cloud.

Airlift and Airborne Operations During World War II: (Enhanced with Text Analytics by PageKicker) (U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II)

Bilstein, Roger

Nimble Books LLC

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