Fundamentals Of Force Planning

Naval War College

the Force Planning Faculty

Richmond M. Lloyd. [et al.]

Naval War College Press

International Law Situations With Solutions and Notes, 1902 (Classic Reprint)

Forgotten Books

International Law Documents, 1921: Conference on the Limitation of Armament; With Notes and Index (Classic Reprint)

Reference

Screaming Trees: The Nigerian Deforestation Crisis

Science & Math

Earth Sciences

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

The Second World War provided a host of challenges for America’s strategic leaders. It can be argued that their most critical challenge was choosing the right operational artists and theater-strategists for the Allied cause. Strategic leaders needed the right operational artists to lead forces in a global, combined, joint fight that spanned four theaters of war and fifteen theaters of operations. Of the national-strategic leaders involved in the selection of theater and operational commanders, General of the Army George C. Marshall stands out. Global war dwarfed military endeavors of the past, requiring an unprecedented number of theater strategists and operational artists. The United States had no formal method to pick these leaders, relying on the professional judgment of men like General Marshall. To fulfill this role he followed the guidance and example of his predecessors; he relied on his experience, preference, and education to select the right operational leaders, then supported them fully. Operational artists and theater-strategists, like Dwight D. Eisenhower, were chosen because they possessed traits Marshall valued, and those traits remain relevant for study and application today.

General of the Army George C. Marshall on Operational Leadership (World War II)

History

Military

With 1,000 Continentals, and slightly more militia, Nathanael Greene was assigned the mission by General Washington to stop the British in the south and to win the Revolution. During this period, the British restored South Carolina’s loyalist government, were victorious at Savannah, Charleston, and Camden, South Carolina, and had numerous Tory sympathizers in the region. Nathanael Greene was to defeat arguably the best army in the world with few regular troops, no supplies, and no local government to call upon for assistance. Further, Greene had to contend with a civil war between the Tories and the Patriots. Despite these hurdles, Greene was able to realize success through his superb example of operational leadership. Many lessons can be applied today. He knew his enemy and accurately identified the enemy center of gravity (COG) and developed a plan to attack the British critical vulnerability, the popular support from the Tory militia. Greene did not win many tactical battles, but was able to occupy the British Army through constant engagements with his forces, which consisted of both Continentals and militia while the Patriot militia regained local support. Greene integrated the militia forces into his own regular forces and commanded a superb sense for operational logistics. Finally, Greene thoroughly understood the importance of balancing ends, ways, and means.

Operational Leadership of Nathanael Greene During the Southern Campaign of 1780-1781 (Revolutionary War)

Americas

The Nigerian Paradox

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

China’s recent military modernization has fundamentally altered Taiwan’s security options. New Chinese submarines, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and, especially, short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles have greatly reduced Taiwan’s geographic advantage. Taipei can no longer expect to counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner, with Patriot interceptors, diesel submarines, surface warships, F-16 fighters, and P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. Taiwan must therefore rethink and redesign its defense strategy, emphasizing the asymmetrical advantage of being the defender, seeking to deny the People’s Republic its strategic objectives rather than attempting to destroy its weapons systems. This would enable Taipei to deter more effectively Beijing’s use of coercive force, would provide better means for Taiwan to resist Chinese attacks should deterrence fail, and would provide the United States additional time to determine whether intervening in a cross-strait conflict was in its own national interest. The strategy would also place the responsibility for Taiwan’s defense squarely on its own military. Finally, it would restore the United States to unambiguous compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been increasingly explicit about its military modernization objectives. China’s 2004 white paper on national defense stated that “the PLA[People’s Liberation Army]will . . . enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities.” The introduction of new classes of advanced surface warships; the unveiling of new nuclear-powered submarines, tactical fighter aircraft, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with advanced warheads; and an antisatellite demonstration—all attest to the determined pursuit of these goals. Many analysts believe that China’s near-term purposes are to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, to provide leverage by which to coerce a reunification with Taiwan if deterrence fails, and to inhibit or delay U.S. intervention in such a conflict. Chinese employment strategies for these new weapons systems and potential capabilities remain unknown, though statements from senior leaders provide important hints. For example, President Hu Jintao is said to have stated in August 2007 that China had five major military priorities relative to Taiwan: establishing military readiness, conducting demonstrative exercises, “imposing a blockade on the Taiwan Strait,” “carrying out combined firepower attacks,” and “[conducting a] cross-sea landing.” Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, boasted in March 2008, “We have the resolve and capability to deal with a major ‘Taiwan independence’ incident at any time.” The likely use of force would encompass three components: long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade. These attack mechanisms would also likely be conducted in close coordination, not independently. Taiwan faces the daunting challenge of how best to deny China the fulfillment of these objectives.

Revisiting Taiwan's Defense Strategy

A commander's ability to leverage operational intelligence remains a cornerstone for managing the uncertainty, fog, and friction of war in this era of seemingly endless advances in battlefield awareness and information dominance. Operational intelligence, properly understood and utilized, can become a force multiplier maximizing traditional operational art factors. The goal is information superiority thereby increasing the speed at which decisions are made, while preempting enemy choices and courses of action. The challenge for the intelligence practitioner is not new. Indeed, WWI provides insights into how contemporary military commanders resemble their counterparts from nearly a century ago. The Battle of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes, Russia's 1914 thrust into east Prussia as an opening salvo of WWI, was a disastrous defeat for Moscow due to German masterful leveraging of operational intelligence. German exploitation of intelligence from Signals, Human, and Imagery vis-à-vis aircraft observation, enabled them to crush the Czar's forces. The story of Tannenberg is a showcase of German successes to gain intelligence about the enemy while denying the Russians the same opportunity. Moreover, German commanders remained receptive and flexible, rapidly incorporating operational intelligence into tactical decision making. The reverse was true for the Russians. Operational intelligence, and the courage and flexibility to incorporate it into tactical and strategic plans, can help commanders manage the enigmatics of war. It worked for the German army in 1914 and can work on today's technologically advanced battlefield.

Leveraging Operational Intelligence: The Battle of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes (1914)

<p>Piracy, or “robbery on the high seas,” has existed for as long as people and commodities have traversed the oceans. The ancient Greeks, Romans, and Chinese all complained of it, and all created naval forces to fight pirates. The word “piracy” comes from the Latin pirate, “sea robber,” and before that from the Greek pirates—“brigand,” or “one who attacks.” Piracy, however, has evolved over time, and this volume examines how piracy and ocean governance have changed from 1608, when the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius published his Mare Liberum [The Freedom of the Seas, or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade]. As modern nation-states emerged from feudalism, privateering for both profit and war supplemented piracy at the margins of national sovereignty. More recently, an ocean enclosure movement under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 has granted states access to maritime resources far beyond their territorial limits. This in turn has given states more responsibility for providing safe passage through their waters. This book provides case studies on how these developments have changed the ways in which nations deal with piracy.Who owns the sea? Who has rights of navigation through its waters? Who is responsible for protecting ships at sea? For most of human history, the high seas were seen as vast, dangerous, uncharted regions filled with demons and dragons. In premodern times, the sea was a space apart from society. ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, a seventh-century Arab military leader who was responsible for the conquest of Egypt in 640, observed, “The sea is a boundless expanse, whereon great ships look tiny specks; nought but the heavens above and waters beneath; when calm, the sailor’s heart is broken; when tempestuous, his senses reel. Trust it little, fear it much. Man at sea is an insect on a splinter, now engulfed, now scared to death.”Throughout much of human history, therefore, it was assumed that the seas could not be owned, occupied, or governed. Fighting pirates at sea, although desirable, was beyond the jurisdiction and ability of most “states,” whether feudal or national. As Grotius asserted in Mare Liberum, “The sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.” Grotius’s view was developed to counter the activities of, in particular, Spain and Portugal, who were using their navies to assert their global maritime spheres of influence. The Dutch and other Europeans also wanted to pursue maritime interests. In this fashion, Grotius’s “freedom of the seas” doctrine became a widely accepted foundation of modern international law.Historically, a state’s sovereignty stopped at the shoreline. The world’s oceans remained open-access, “common pool” resources. “How can a country control the seas?” asked the ruler of Macassar in the early seventeenth century, when the Dutch were attempting to monopolize the spice trade: “God has made the earth and the sea, has divided the earth among mankind and given the sea in common. It is a thing unheard of that anyone should be forbidden to sail the seas.”</p>

Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies

Andrew Forbes

DAVID, ROSENBERG

Bruce A. Elleman

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