Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.

The Logic of Delegation (American Politics and Political Economy Series)

Politics & Social Sciences

McCubbins, Mathew D.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick

Politics & Government

University of Chicago Press

Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.

The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (American Politics and Political Economy Series)

This book provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Reevaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins view parties in the House—especially majority parties—as a species of "legislative cartel." These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general, and the committee system in particular, is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because the majority party has all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of that party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership. Debunking prevailing arguments about the weakening of congressional parties, Cox and McCubbins powerfully illuminate the ways in which parties exercise considerable discretion in organizing the House to carry out its work. This work will have an important impact on the study of American politics, and will greatly interest students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.

Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy)

History

Cox, Gary W.

Americas

University of California Press

This book provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Reevaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins view parties in the House―especially majority parties―as a species of "legislative cartel." These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general, and the committee system in particular, is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because the majority party has all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of that party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership. Debunking prevailing arguments about the weakening of congressional parties, Cox and McCubbins powerfully illuminate the ways in which parties exercise considerable discretion in organizing the House to carry out its work. This work will have an important impact on the study of American politics, and will greatly interest students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.

Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy) (Volume 23)

Cox, Gary W. W.

The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Most citizens seem underinformed about politics. Many experts claim that only well-informed citizens can make good political decisions. Is this claim correct? In The Democratic Dilemma, Professors Lupia and McCubbins combine insights from political science, economics and the cognitive sciences to explain how citizens gather and use information. They show when citizens who lack information can (and cannot) make the same decisions they would have made if better informed. As a result, they clarify the debate about citizen competence.

Lupia, Arthur

Social Sciences

Cambridge University Press

Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances a partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.

Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives

Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House

The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.

Business & Money

Economics

Japanese Law in Context: Readings in Society, the Economy, and Politics (Harvard East Asian Monographs)

This is a wide-ranging selection of 130 readings in Japanese law. The essays, extracted from previously published books and articles, cover subjects including historical context, the civil law tradition, the legal services industry, dispute resolution, constitutional law, contracts, torts, criminal law, family law, employment law, corporate law, and economic regulation. This unique collection of readings is accompanied by the texts of the Japanese constitution and other basic laws.

Computers & Technology

West, Mark D.

Hendry, Joy

THOMPSON, Mark

Johnson, Chalmers

Young, Leslie

Fallows, James

Shapiro, Martin

Becker, Gary S.

Chira, Susan

Van Wolferen, Karel

BOK, DEREK

Merryman, John Henry

Bayley, David H.

Weingast, Barry R.

Field, Norma

Bernstein, Lisa

Magee, Stephen P.

Brock, William A.

Dubro, Alec

Roe, Mark J.

Nakazato, Minoru

Shleifer, Andrei

Lohr, Steve

Rohlen, Thomas P.

Murphy, Kevin M.

Vishny, Robert W.

Pascale, Richard

Noble, Gregory W.

Upham, Frank K.

Bryant, Taimie L.

Krauss, Ellis S.

Smith, Thomas C.

Kidder, Robert L.

Crabb, Kelly

Miyazawa, Setsuo

Foote, Daniel H.

Miller, Geoffrey P.

Fukao, Mitsuhiro

Muramatsu, Michio

Smith, Robert Eliot

Eng, Robert Y.

Gilson, Ronald J.

Abegglen, James

Abowd, John M.

Amaya, Naohiro

Ames, Walter

Asanuma, Banri

Calvert, Randall L.

Coleman, Samuel

Edwards, Linda N.

Fukushima, Glen S.

Haley, John O.

Hamilton, Constance

Heftel, Chris

Henderson, Dan Fenno

Kaplan, David S.

Kaplan, Steven N.

Kawashima, Takeyosi

Minton, Bernadette A.

Moran, Mark J.

Muto, Shunko

Notehelfer, F. G.

Olson Jr., Mancur

Parkinson, Lorraine

Sheard, Paul

Sklar, Deborah

Smith, Malcolm D. H.

Stalk Jr, George

Takasugi, Shingo

Tanaka, Hideo

Weinstein, David E.

Wiswell, Ella

Yokoyama, Minoru

Yonemoto, Kazuhiro

Zaloom, E. Anthony

Software

Harvard University Asia Center

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