The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid

The authors argue that much of foreign aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. They explore the workings of Sida and find that Sida's institutions lead to perverse incentives and poor outcomes in the field. The authors offer concrete suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness.

Business & Money

OSTROM, ELINOR

Andersson, Krister

Gibson, Clark C.

Shivakumar, Sujai

Economics

Oxford University Press

What's wrong with foreign aid? Many policymakers, aid practitioners, and scholars have called into question its ability to increase economic growth, alleviate poverty, or promote social development. At the macro level, only tenuous links between development aid and improved living conditions have been found. At the micro level, only a few programs outlast donor support and even fewer appear to achieve lasting improvements. The authors of this book argue that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid delivery system and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. In their analysis, the authors apply the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics to several settings. First, they investigate the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, the authors use cases from India, a country with low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries also mediate the effectiveness of aid. Throughout the book, the authors offer suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. These suggestions include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as "owners" in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation processes of development assistance programs.

This book explores the politics of wildlife conservation policy in Africa, specifically Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The book addresses a general question: Why don't wildlife policies seem to be working? Rather than use standard explanations such as "bureaucratic inefficiency" or "corrupt dictators," the book demonstrates how politicians at all levels use wildlife policy for their own political ends, which may or may not include conservation. The book uses electoral and archival data, as well as interviews with individuals ranging from presidents to poachers to address this issue.

Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Cambridge University Press

This book explores the politics of wildlife conservation policy in Africa, specifically Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The book addresses a general question: Why don't wildlife policies seem to be working? Rather than use standard explanations such as "bureaucratic inefficiency" or "corrupt dictators," the book demonstrates how politicians at all levels use wildlife policy for their own political ends, which may or may not include conservation. The book uses electoral and archival data, as well as interviews with individuals ranging from presidents to poachers to address this issue.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Gibson, Clark C.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Gibson, Clark C.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Gibson, Clark C.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid

The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid

Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)