The humanities and the sciences face challenging times, each in their own way. The humanities suffer shrinking enrollments and budgets, and are perceived by some as irrelevant in a changing economy. The sciences face a political climate that disrespects academic expertise and challenges settled debates. Meanwhile age-old disputes about their spheres of knowledge continue: does scientific knowledge subsume that of the humanities? Are their forms of knowledge complementary, or ultimately at odds? Richard Foley, a philosopher of knowledge and the former Dean of Arts and Sciences at New York University, here provides a concise and accessible overview of what the overarching goals of these disciplines are, relative to one another, and what kind of knowledge they aim to produce. His fundamental argument is that the sciences aim at insights that ideally are not limited to particular locations or times and are also perspective-free and wholly descriptive, whereas the humanities appropriately seek insights about specific locations and times, with the insights being perspective-based and having evaluative as well as descriptive elements. He also finds these two spheres of knowledge to be complementary in the search for understanding of our world and the human condition. The ultimate goal of Foley's investigation however is an eloquent defense and celebration of the culture of academic research. In an era of sound-bites and tweet-length falsehoods, this culture values and supports long-term intellectual achievements for the good of humanity - produced with hard work, dedication, and patience. The Geography of Insight is essential reading for readers both inside and outside of the academy.

The Geography of Insight: The Sciences, the Humanities, How they Differ, Why They Matter

Politics & Social Sciences

Foley, Richard

Philosophy

Oxford University Press

In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action. His approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the question of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues; the relevance of skeptical hypotheses; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of knowledge; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of rational degrees of belief; and the limits of idealization in epistemology.

Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology

Business & Money

Economics

Epistemology with a Broad and Long View

To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this novel and provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defense of the reliability of one's faculties, methods, and opinions that does not beg the question.

Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Cambridge University Press

To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this novel and provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defense of the reliability of one's faculties, methods, and opinions that does not beg the question.

Most Perl programmers know about the Perl debugger-the nifty little built-in utility that you can use to fully debug any programs that you write. Inside the interactive debugger environment, you're prompted for commands that let you examine your source code, set breakpoints, dump out function call stacks, change values of variables, and much more. It's so convenient that some programmers run it just to test out Perl constructs as they create a program. But although it's on their radar, not many Perl programmers take the time to master the debugger. That's where the Perl Debugger Pocket Reference comes in. This little book provides a quick and convenient path to mastery of the Perl debugger and its commands. Written by a core member of the Perl debugger development team, it's an ideal quick reference to debugger commands, as well as a detailed tutorial on how to get started. The Perl Debugger Pocket Reference provides complete coverage in a conveniently small package. Maybe you write code so clean you never have to look at it twice. Or perhaps you'd rather focus your energies on writing clean code, rather than learning about the debugger. But if you need to learn about the Perl debugger in a hurry, the Perl Debugger Pocket Reference is the book you'll want to have close by. And you can always keep a copy on hand to share with programmers who need it more than you do. O'Reilly's Pocket References have become a favorite among programmers everywhere. By providing a wealth of important details in a concise, well-organized format, these handy books deliver just what you need to complete the task at hand. When you've reached a sticking point in your work and need to get to a solution quickly, the new Perl Debugger Pocket Reference will get you back on the right track.

Perl Debugger Pocket Reference

Computers & Technology

Web Development & Design

O'Reilly Media

The Theory of Epistemic Rationality

Harvard University Press

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
 In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information.
 Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

When Is True Belief Knowledge? (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy)

Princeton University Press

The practice of the Court of Great Sessions for the several counties of Carmarthen, Pembroke, and Cardigan; the county of the borough of Carmarthen; ... of Haverfordwest. By Richard Foley, ...

Social Sciences

Gale ECCO, Print Editions

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Books by Foley, Richard