The Arsenal Ship acquisition program was unique in two respects: it represented a new operational concept for Navy weapon systems, and its management structure and process represented a significant departure from traditional military ship-building programs. The Arsenal Ship program was, in effect, an experiment; while Navy envisioned an array of mission capabilities for thw ship, it set the project budget as the single immovable requiremnet.

The Arsenal Ship Acquisition Process Experience: Contrasting and Common Impressions From the Contractor Teams and Joint Program Office

Engineering & Transportation

Drezner, Jeffrey A.

Leonard, Robert S.

Sommer, Geoffrey

Engineering

RAND Corporation

In 1994, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office launched a joint initiative with thegoal to overcome the impediments that had hampered past unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development. This effort designated the High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (HAE UAV ACTD) program applied an innovative acquisition strategy to the development of two UAVs: one conventionally configured (Global Hawk) and the other with a low observable configuration (DarkStar). The report summarizes the major research findings regarding the HAE UAV ACTD program's acquisition strategy. The authors conclude that despite DarkStar's cancellation and despite overall program cost growth and schedule slippage in basic design and test of the two HAE UAV concepts, the ACTD program did accomplish its primary objective by successfully demonstrating the military utility of a UAV with a continuous, all weather, wide area surveillance capability. Although the program's single requirement the unit fly away price was not met, it did promote cost consciousness while at the same time preventing the imposition of additional system capabilities during the basic system development. The authors found the program's use of Other Transaction Authority to lend considerable flexibility to the effort. While the program's designation as an ACTD imposed cost and schedule boundaries that constrained system development, it also provided a high degree of flexibility to adjust the program execution. Areas of risk were addressed as they arose, and early flight test experience was assimilated into continuing system development efforts. Relatively modest changes in up front planning processes, the structured participation of operational users early in the program, and contract language regarding oversight processes and incentives would ensure successful application of the acquisi

Innovative Development Executive Summary--Global Hawk and DarkStar: Their Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program Experience, Executive Summary (2002)

Science & Math

The past three decades have seen a number of less-than-successful efforts to develop high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. In 1994, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, initiated an effort — designated the High-Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (HAE UAV ACTD) — whose goal was to facilitate the development of UAVs through the use of a new and innovative acquisition strategy. This report addresses the effect of that acquisition strategy on the flight test program of the two air vehicles: the conventional Global Hawk and the low-observable DarkStar. The authors found that because DarkStar was canceled after having logged only 6.5 flight hours, not enough flight experience was accumulated to allow for an understanding of the vehicle's flight characteristics or military utility. By contrast, Global Hawk accumulated ample experience to permit a demonstration of its military utility, achieving a level of performance that was close to predicted goals. The precise effect of the HAE UAV acquisition strategy remains the subject of debate. The strategy did, however, influence some key aspects of the flight test program, most notably its increased contractor involvement and its early operational testing in the form of user demonstrations. The flight test program also served to illustrate the vital need for early involvement of operational users to bolster the capabilities and perspective of the contractor.

Innovative Development: Global Hawk and DarkStar--Flight Test in the HAE UAV ACTD Program (2001)

Over the past three decades, a number of attempts have been made to develop unmanned aerial vehicles, but many of these efforts have met with suboptimal results. Recently, however, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in conjunction with the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, launched an effort — designated the HighAltitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Advanced concept Technology Demonstration (HAE UAV ACTD) program — whose objective was to overcome past constraints in UAV development through the use of a new acquisition policy. This report assesses two transitions of the HAE UAV ACTD program — the first from DARPA to Air Force management and the second from an ACTD to a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) — toward the goal of determining which elements of the program's novel acquisition strategy facilitated these transitions and which engendered problems. The authors found that in aggregate, the innovative acquisition strategy adopted in the HAE UAV ACTD program had a positive effect on program execution in that it successfully attained the program's key goals: demonstrating a new operational concept at a lower cost and in a shorter time frame than would have been possible with a traditional acquisition approach. The program's transition from the ACTD construct to an MDAP, however — although ultimately successful — posed a number of challenges, many of which stemmed directly from its acquisition strategy. To circumvent these problems in the future, the authors recommend that all organizations involved in a program, particularly operational users, be given substantive input into program planning at the earliest possible juncture.

Innovative Development: Global Hawk and DarkStar- Transitions Within and Out of the HAE UAV ACTD Program (2002)

Responds to Senate's comcerns that further consolidation in the military-aircraft industry, which has dropped from 11 prime contractors in 1960 to the current three, dwill pose risks to innovation and cost through limited or no competition in contracting for military aircraft and related weapon systems for the Department of Denfense.

Competition and Innovation in the U.S. Fixed-Wing Military Aircraft Industry

History

Birkler, John

Lee, Gordon

Bower, Anthony G.

Lorell, Mark

Military

Defense acquisition is one of the most urgent issues that the Department of Defense faces today. In an effort to provide the department and the nation with guidance on defense acquisition challenges, the authors present detailed proposals to improve defense acquisition through initiatives focused on competition, novel systems, risk management, organizational factors, prototyping, and the acquisition workforce.

From Marginal Adjustments to Meaningful Change: Rethinking Weapon System Acquisition (Rand Corporation Monograph)

Gates, Susan M.

Arena, Mark V.

Blickstein, Irv

To determine whether the industrial base for the U.S. domestic coal-based electricity generation industry can maintain the capability to design, construct, operate, and maintain coal-fired electricity generating units within reasonable cost, schedule, performance, environmental, and quality expectations, this book reviewsinterviews with stakeholders and data describing key elements of industry capability and validation or verification of concerns.

Characterizing the U.S. Industrial Base for Coal-Powered Electricity (Rand Corporation Monograph)

Business & Money

Bloom, Evan

Willis, Henry H.

Samaras, Constantine

Management & Leadership

The U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems program aimed to field an ambitious system of systems, with novel technologies integrated via an advanced wireless network. The largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army's history, it was cancelled in 2009, and some of its efforts transitioned to follow-on programs. This report documents the program's complex history and draws lessons from its experiences.

Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems Program

Sollinger, Jerry M.

Wilson, Peter A.

Perry, Walter L.

Pernin, Christopher G.

McMahon, K. Scott

Gordon IV, John

Axelband, Elliot

Dille, Brian B.

Held, Bruce J.

Rizzi, Christopher

Shah, Akhil R.

Recent statutory changes to DoD organizational structures, roles, responsibilities, and authorities have introduced new challenges and opportunities that significantly affect acquisition information management and governance. This research identifies and describes specific data challenges associated with the Middle Tier of Acquisition, the Selected Acquisition Report, and the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary process and data.

Issues with Access to Acquisition Information in the Department of Defense: A Series on Considerations for Managing Program Data in the Emerging Acquisition Environment

Acquiring a Mosaic Force: Issues, Options, and Trade-Offs

Wilson, Bradley

Wirth, Anna Jean

McLane, Liam

Schmid, Jon

Bartels, Elizabeth M.

Predd, Joel B.

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Books by Drezner, Jeffrey A.