A narrative history and assessment of the early years of Robert McNamara’s tenure as Secretary of Defense, including McNamara’s relationship with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the transformation of the Department of Defense as a part of Kennedy’s New Frontier, and the Pentagon’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs episode, and onset of the Vietnam War along with other major national security events and developments during a turbulent and momentous period of the Cold War. (Fuller description is on the dust jacket flaps.)

History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. 5: The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965

History

Kaplan, Lawrence S.

Drea, Edward J.

Landa, Ronald D.

Military

Government Printing Office

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT -OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price Covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the tenure of Clark M. Clifford. McNamara's key role in the United States' involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 forms the centerpiece of the narrative that was the last four years of the Lyndon Johnson Administration. The escalating war tested Robert McNamara's reforms and abilities and shaped every aspect of the U.S. Defense Department's planning, programming,g and budgeting. This volume is organized by the years around the Vietnam conflict and its influene on Defense budgets, the national economy, national military strategy, technology, civil-military relations, and the home front. Historians, political scientists and students steudying the Vietnam conflict in history, political and military science courses may want to refer to this work as a reference for essays and term papers. High school, academic and public libraries may be interested in this volume for their historical reference collections. 
Other related products:
Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960-1968 is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01082-0?ctid=1138
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Vietnam War resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/vietn...

History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. 6: McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969

Biographies & Memoirs

Leaders & Notable People

United States Department of Defense

Cracking the enemy's radio code is a task so urgent and so difficult that it demands the military's best minds and most sophisticated technology. But when the coded messages are in a language as complex as Japanese, decoding problems multiply dramatically. 
It took the U.S. Army a full two years after the attack on Pearl Harbor to break the codes of the Japanese Imperial Army. But by 1944 the U.S. was decoding more than 20,000 messages a month filled with information about enemy movements, strategy, fortifications, troop strengths, and supply convoys. 
In MacArthur's ULTRA, historian Edward Drea recounts the story behind the Army's painstaking decryption operation and its dramatic breakthrough. He demonstrates how ULTRA (intelligence from decrypted Japanese radio communications) shaped MacArthur's operations in New Guinea and the Philippines and its effect on the outcome of World War II. 
From sources on both sides of the Pacific and national security agency declassified records, Drea has compiled a detailed listing of the ULTRA intelligence available to MacArthur. By correlating the existing intelligence with MacArthur's operational decisions, Drea shows how MacArthur used--and misused--intelligence information. He tells for the first time the story behind MacArthur's bold leap to Hollandia in 1944 and shows how ULTRA revealed the massive Japanese mobilization for what might have been (had it occurred) the bloodiest and most protracted engagement of the entire war--the Allied invasion of Japan. Drea also clarifies the role of ULTRA in Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, and concludes that ULTRA shortened the war by six to ten months. 
This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945 (Modern war studies)

University Press of Kansas

Cracking the enemy's radio code is a task so urgent and so difficult that it demands the military's best minds and most sophisticated technology. But when the coded messages are in a language as complex as Japanese, decoding problems multiply dramatically. It took the U.S. Army a full two years after the attack on Pearl Harbor to break the codes of the Japanese Imperial Army. But by 1944 the U.S. was decoding more than 20,000 messages a month filled with information about enemy movements, strategy, fortifications, troop strengths, and supply convoys. In MacArthur's ULTRA, historian Edward Drea recounts the story behind the Army's painstaking decryption operation and its dramatic breakthrough. He demonstrates how ULTRA (intelligence from decrypted Japanese radio communications) shaped MacArthur's operations in New Guinea and the Philippines and its effect on the outcome of World War II. From sources on both sides of the Pacific and national security agency declassified records, Drea has compiled a detailed listing of the ULTRA intelligence available to MacArthur. By correlating the existing intelligence with MacArthur's operational decisions, Drea shows how MacArthur usedand misusedintelligence information. He tells for the first time the story behind MacArthur's bold leap to Hollandia in 1944 and shows how ULTRA revealed the massive Japanese mobilization for what might have been (had it occurred) the bloodiest and most protracted engagement of the entire war the Allied invasion of Japan. Drea also clarifies the role of ULTRA in Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, and concludes that ULTRA shortened the war by six to ten months.

MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945 (Modern War Studies)

Popular impressions of the imperial Japanese army still promote images of suicidal banzai charges and fanatical leaders blindly devoted to their emperor. Edward Drea looks well past those stereotypes to unfold the more complex story of how that army came to power and extended its influence at home and abroad to become one of the world's dominant fighting forces. This first comprehensive English-language history of the Japanese army traces its origins, evolution, and impact as an engine of the country's regional and global ambitions and as a catalyst for the militarization of the Japanese homeland from mid-nineteenth-century incursions through the end of World War II. Demonstrating his mastery of Japanese-language sources, Drea explains how the Japanese style of warfare, burnished by samurai legends, shaped the army, narrowed its options, influenced its decisions, and made it the institution that conquered most of Asia. He also tells how the army's intellectual foundations shifted as it reinvented itself to fulfill the changing imperatives of Japanese society-and how the army in turn decisively shaped the nation's political, social, cultural, and strategic course. Drea recounts how Japan devoted an inordinate amount of its treasury toward modernizing, professionalizing, and training its army—which grew larger, more powerful, and politically more influential with each passing decade. Along the way, it produced an efficient military schooling system, a well-organized active duty and reserve force, a professional officer corps that thought in terms of regional threat, and well-trained soldiers armed with appropriate weapons. Encompassing doctrine, strategy, weaponry, and civil-military relations, Drea's expert study also captures the dominant personalities who shaped the imperial army, from Yamagata Aritomo, an incisive geopolitical strategist, to Anami Korechika, who exhorted the troops to fight to the death during the final days of World War II. Summing up, Drea also suggests that an army that places itself above its nation's interests is doomed to failure.

Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Modern War Studies Series)

Asia

Society for Military History Distinguished Book Award Popular impressions of the imperial Japanese army still promote images of suicidal banzai charges and fanatical leaders blindly devoted to their emperor. Edward Drea looks well past those stereotypes to unfold the more complex story of how that army came to power and extended its influence at home and abroad to become one of the world's dominant fighting forces. This first comprehensive English-language history of the Japanese army traces its origins, evolution, and impact as an engine of the country's regional and global ambitions and as a catalyst for the militarization of the Japanese homeland from mid-nineteenth-century incursions through the end of World War II. Demonstrating his mastery of Japanese-language sources, Drea explains how the Japanese style of warfare, burnished by samurai legends, shaped the army, narrowed its options, influenced its decisions, and made it the institution that conquered most of Asia. He also tells how the army's intellectual foundations shifted as it reinvented itself to fulfill the changing imperatives of Japanese society-and how the army in turn decisively shaped the nation's political, social, cultural, and strategic course. Drea recounts how Japan devoted an inordinate amount of its treasury toward modernizing, professionalizing, and training its army—which grew larger, more powerful, and politically more influential with each passing decade. Along the way, it produced an efficient military schooling system, a well-organized active duty and reserve force, a professional officer corps that thought in terms of regional threat, and well-trained soldiers armed with appropriate weapons. Encompassing doctrine, strategy, weaponry, and civil-military relations, Drea's expert study also captures the dominant personalities who shaped the imperial army, from Yamagata Aritomo, an incisive geopolitical strategist, to Anami Korechika, who exhorted the troops to fight to the death during the final days of World War II. Summing up, Drea also suggests that an army that places itself above its nation's interests is doomed to failure.

Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall (Modern War Studies)

In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Studies in War, Society, and the Military)

Japan’s war in Asia and the Pacific from 1937 to 1945 continues to be a subject of great interest, yet the wartime Japanese army remains little understood outside Japan. Most published accounts rely on English-language works written in the 1950s and 1960s. The Japanese-language sources have remained relatively inaccessible to Western scholars in part because of the difficulty of the language, a difficulty that Edward J. Drea, who reads Japanese, surmounts. 
In a series of searching examinations of the structure, ethos, and goals of the Japanese military establishment, Drea offers new material on its tactics, operations, doctrine, and leadership. Based on original military documents, official histories, court diaries, and Emperor Hirohito’s own words, these twelve essays introduce Western readers to fifty years of Japanese scholarship about the war and Japan’s military institutions. In addition, Drea uses recently declassified Allied intelligence documents related to Japan to challenge existing views and conventional wisdom about the war.

Americas

University Of Nebraska Press

"Nomonhan" was a strong beginning for the Combat Studies Institute's publishing program. Author Drea's mastery of the Japanese-language source material, his interviews, his thorough use of U.S. archival material all make this a superb study that stands the test of time. Goldman and Coox have written on Nomonhan sice this volume was released, however neither does what Drea does here: render a complete, battalion-level account of the battles from the Japanese perspective. This is tactical level combat explained at its best. Previously available only in hard-to read html and Acrobat files, this completely redesigned book includes 19 maps, dozens of tables and pictures (including combat photographs), appendices, notes, and a bibliography. About the author: Dr. Edward J. Drea was a research fellow with the Combat Studies Institute. He received his masters degree in history from Sophia University, Tokyo and his PhD from the University of Kansas. He lived and studied in Japan for six years.

Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939

lulu.com

Before World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe, the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June trough August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian-Manchurian border. This essay follows the daily combat operations of the IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2/28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces. In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K. Zhukov. When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy. A lack of flexibility doomed the Japanese defensive effort. General Zhukov secretly marshalled his forces and in mid-August used his armor columns to spearhead a double envelopment of the static Japanese units in a position defense. The Soviets encircled the Japanese units, including the 2/28th Infantry, and the Japanese survivors had to fight their way back to friendly lines. The 2/28th Infantry's War Diary provides a vivid day-by-day account of its combat operations. This in turn allows the examination of how the Japanese applied their tactical doctrine on the battlefield. The Japanese tried to use and aggressive tactical doctrine to compensate for materiel and equipment deficiencies in their army. Such an approach was successful as long as the Japanese could conduct bold offensive operations. When they were forced to adopt a defensive posture, however, discrepancies between tactical doctrine and battlefield reality became apparent. These problems, applicable to any army, highlight fundamental difficulties of force structure, preconceptions of potential enemy capabilities, and the role of doctrine in a combat environment. An examination of small unit tactics is particularly useful to illustrate the dynamics of doctrine as expressed on the battlefield.

University Press of the Pacific

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Drea, Edward J.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Drea, Edward J.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Drea, Edward J.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. 5: The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965

History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. 6: McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969

MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945 (Modern war studies)

MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945 (Modern War Studies)

Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Modern War Studies Series)

Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall (Modern War Studies)

In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Studies in War, Society, and the Military)

In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Studies in War, Society, and the Military)

Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939

Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939