As the might and capabilities of American airpower have grown during the last sixty years, so has the controversy about its use in the intentional and indiscriminate wartime bombardment of civilians. In Bombs, Cities, and Civilians, Conrad Crane maintains that, for the most part, American airmen in World War II remained committed to precision bombing doctrine. Instead of attacking densely populated urban areas simply to erode civilian morale, Army Air Forces adhered to a policy that emphasized targeting key industrial and military sites. He demonstrates that while the British, Germans, and Japanese routinely conducted indiscriminate aerial bombardment of enemy cities, American airmen consistently stayed with daylight raids against carefully selected targets, especially in Europe. Daytime precision missions were usually far more dangerous than night area attacks, but such Army Air Force tactics increased bombing efficiency and also reduced the risk of civilian casualties. This is the first book to respond to recent assertions by other historians that due to military necessity, vague policies, or the desire to maximize technology, Army Air Forces bombers in World War II exercised little restraint on attacks against civilians. Even though bombing policy was influenced more by the attitudes of airmen in operations rooms and in combat than by directives from leaders in Washington, Crane contends that air commanders in the field did consistently conform to the guidelines of precision doctrine. Crane also shows, however, that different leaders, command arrangements, and combat conditions in the Pacific led to bombing policies that were much less discriminating concerning target selection. Focusing on specific operations and key operational commanders, such as Carl Spaatz in Europe and Curtis LeMay in the Pacific, he illustrates how different situations and personalities influenced bombing policies. Despite deviations from precision bombing doctrine in the Pacific that led to incendiary raids on Japanese cities, Crane contends that the pursuit of accurate bombing remained a primary goal throughout World War II and remains one today. Beginning with the lessons gleaned from World War I, he traces the evolution of American doctrine and technology for conventional bombing through the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. In the process, he demonstrates how public opinion, combat conditions, technological innovation, and the search for "Victory through Airpower" have affected bombing operations and military policy. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II

History

Crane, Conrad C.

Military

Univ Pr of Kansas

The Korean War was the first armed engagement for the newly formed U.S. Air Force, but far from the type of conflict it expected or wanted to fight. As the first air war of the nuclear age, it posed a major challenge to the service to define and successfully carry out its mission by stretching the constraints of limited war while avoiding the excesses of total war. Conrad Crane analyzes both the successes and failures of the air force in Korea, offering a balanced treatment of how the air war in Korea actually unfolded. He examines the Air Force's contention that it could play a decisive role in a non-nuclear regional war but shows that the fledgling service was held to unrealistically high expectations based on airpower's performance in World War II, despite being constrained by the limited nature of the Korean conflict. Crane exposes the tensions and rivalries between services, showing that emphasis on strategic bombing came at the expense of air support for ground troops, and he tells how interactions between army and air force generals shaped the air force's mission and strategy. He also addresses misunderstandings about plans to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the war and includes new information from pilot correspondence about the informal policy of "hot pursuit" over the Yalu that existed at the end of the war. The book considers not only the actual air effort in Korea but also its ramifications. The air force doubled in size during the war and used that growth to secure its position in the defense establishment, but it wagered its future on its ability to deliver nuclear weapons in a high-intensity conflict—a position that left it unprepared to fight the next limited war in Vietnam. As America observes the fiftieth anniversary of its initial engagement in Korea, Crane's book is an important reminder of the lessons learned there. And as airpower continues to be a cornerstone of American defense, this examination of its uses in Korea provides new insights about the air force's capabilities and limitations.

American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953

Asia

University Press of Kansas

As the might and capabilities of American airpower have grown during the last sixty years, so has the controversy about its use in the intentional and indiscriminate wartime bombardment of civilians. In Bombs, Cities, and Civilians, Conrad Crane maintains that, for the most part, American airmen in World War II remained committed to precision bombing doctrine. Instead of attacking densely populated urban areas simply to erode civilian morale, Army Air Forces adhered to a policy that emphasized targeting key industrial and military sites. He demonstrates that while the British, Germans, and Japanese routinely conducted indiscriminate aerial bombardment of enemy cities, American airmen consistently stayed with daylight raids against carefully selected targets, especially in Europe. Daytime precision missions were usually far more dangerous than night area attacks, but such Army Air Force tactics increased bombing efficiency and also reduced the risk of civilian casualties. This is the first book to respond to recent assertions by other historians that due to military necessity, vague policies, or the desire to maximize technology, Army Air Forces bombers in World War II exercised little restraint on attacks against civilians. Even though bombing policy was influenced more by the attitudes of airmen in operations rooms and in combat than by directives from leaders in Washington, Crane contends that air commanders in the field did consistently conform to the guidelines of precision doctrine. Crane also shows, however, that different leaders, command arrangements, and combat conditions in the Pacific led to bombing policies that were much less discriminating concerning target selection. Focusing on specific operations and key operational commanders, such as Carl Spaatz in Europe and Curtis LeMay in the Pacific, he illustrates how different situations and personalities influenced bombing policies. Despite deviations from precision bombing doctrine in the Pacific that led to incendiary raids on Japanese cities, Crane contends that the pursuit of accurate bombing remained a primary goal throughout World War II and remains one today. Beginning with the lessons gleaned from World War I, he traces the evolution of American doctrine and technology for conventional bombing through the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. In the process, he demonstrates how public opinion, combat conditions, technological innovation, and the search for "Victory through Airpower" have affected bombing operations and military policy.

Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Modern War Studies)

Resistance is a product of will times means, Carl von Clausewitz postulated in his treatise On War. In his 1993 Bombs, Cities, and Civilians, which the American Historical Review judged “must reading for anyone interested in the subject of air warfare,” Conrad C. Crane focused on the moral dimension of American air strategy in World War II—specifically, the Allied effort to break the enemy’s will through targeting civilians. With decades of research and reflection, and a wealth of new material at his command, Crane returns to the subject of America’s WWII airpower strategy to offer an analysis fully engaged with the “means” side of Clausewitz’s equation: the design and impact of strategic bombing of the enemy’s infrastructure and thus its capacity to fight. A marked advance in our understanding of the use of airpower in war in general and the Second World War in particular, Crane’s work shows how, despite an undeniable lack of concern about civilian casualties in Germany and Japan late in the war, American strategic bombing in WWII consistently focused on destroying the enemy’s war-making capacity instead of its collapsing will. Further, Crane persuasively argues that in the limited wars since then, separating such targets has become increasingly more difficult, and all air campaigns against states have subsequently escalated to accept greater risks for civilians. American Airpower Strategy in World War II also provides an expanded close look at the use of airpower in the last three months of the strategic air war against Germany, when so many bombing missions relied upon radar aids, as well as the first direct comparison of 8th and 15th Air Force bombing campaigns in Europe. The result is the most coherent and concise analysis of the application and legacy of Allied strategic airpower in WWII—and a work that will inform all future practical and theoretical consideration of the use, and the role, of airpower in war.

American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil (Modern War Studies)

Resistance is a product of will times means, Carl von Clausewitz postulated in his treatise On War. In his 1993 Bombs, Cities, and Civilians, which the American Historical Review judged “must reading for anyone interested in the subject of air warfare,” Conrad C. Crane focused on the moral dimension of American air strategy in World War II—specifically, the Allied effort to break the enemy’s will through targeting civilians. With decades of research and reflection, and a wealth of new material at his command, Crane returns to the subject of America’s WWII airpower strategy to offer an analysis fully engaged with the “means” side of Clausewitz’s equation: the design and impact of strategic bombing of the enemy’s infrastructure and thus its capacity to fight.\nA marked advance in our understanding of the use of airpower in war in general and the Second World War in particular, Crane’s work shows how, despite an undeniable lack of concern about civilian casualties in Germany and Japan late in the war, American strategic bombing in WWII consistently focused on destroying the enemy’s war-making capacity instead of its collapsing will. Further, Crane persuasively argues that in the limited wars since then, separating such targets has become increasingly more difficult, and all air campaigns against states have subsequently escalated to accept greater risks for civilians. American Airpower Strategy in World War II also provides an expanded close look at the use of airpower in the last three months of the strategic air war against Germany, when so many bombing missions relied upon radar aids, as well as the first direct comparison of 8th and 15th Air Force bombing campaigns in Europe.\nThe result is the most coherent and concise analysis of the application and legacy of Allied strategic airpower in WWII—and a work that will inform all future practical and theoretical consideration of the use, and the role, of airpower in war.

During World War II, the U.S. military's extensive planning for the occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict operations and the criticality of detailed planning and preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities...

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, And Missions For Military Forces In A Post-Conflict Scenario

Institute, Strategic Studies

Terrill PH D, Dr W Andrew

Middle East

lulu.com

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario

During World War II, the U. S. military's extensive planning for the occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict operations and the criticality of detailed planning and preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U. S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The Strategic Studies Institute organized an interdisciplinary team under the leadership of Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. The team's initial findings were vetted at a joint and interagency workshop conducted in December. The final report of the project consists of three parts: a discussion of historical insights from 20th century postwar occupations and post-conflict operations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq will present for an occupying power; and a mission matrix that lists 135 specific tasks that must be performed to build and sustain a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across four phases of occupation and designates whether coalition military forces or civilian agencies should perform them. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. In recent decades, U. S. civilian and military leadership have shied away from nation-building. However, the current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies Institute

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

University Press of the Pacific

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Crane, Conrad C.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Crane, Conrad C.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Crane, Conrad C.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II

American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953

Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Modern War Studies)

American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil (Modern War Studies)

American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil (Modern War Studies)

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, And Missions For Military Forces In A Post-Conflict Scenario

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario