CMH Pub 91-6. United States Army in Vietnam. Covers the United States buildup in Vietnam from every angle: strategy, operations, tactics, logistics, inter-service relations, personnel policy, diplomacy, civil relations, and the handling of the news media to show how the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) developed and became the linchpin holding the entire American effort in Vietnam together.

MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-1967 (United States Army in Vietnam)

History

Cosmas, Graham A.

Military

Government Printing Office

CMH 91-7-1. United States Army in Vietnam. 2nd of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. Traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from the Communist Tet offensive of early 1968 through the disestablishment of MACV in March 1973. Deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations.

Macv, the Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973

Bernan Assoc

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT-- OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price  History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pt. 3. At head of title: History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Revised version edited by David Armstrong, Director for Joint History. Describes the formulation of policies and decisions during the years 1967-1968, the period during which the United States military escalation in Southeast Asia culminated. Other products produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1309 Vietnam War resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/vietnam-war

Joint Chiefs Of Staff And The War In Vietnam 1960-1968 Part 3

This volume is the standard accurate modern account of the organization, administration, and strategic direction of the United States Army in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Popular history has traditionally laid the responsibility for the spectacular blunders of the Spanish-American War on those military and civilian officials who controlled the War Department.But this fully documented study of all aspects of the Army administration shows quite a different picture. Cosmas, in an almost day-by-day account of both the Army and the war, makes clear the factors that invited many of its disasters. The Congressional penury of the 1890s, the political conflict in Congress between state militia advocates and the Administration, the frequent shifts of strategy forced on the Army by President William McKinley's changes in diplomacy - all contributed to the peculiarly amateur quality of the land forces that went ashore in Cuba. The Puerto Rico and Philippine campaigns, which were prosecuted later and under better circumstances, were more efficiently conducted but less newsworthy.An Army for Empire is a complete and authoritative history that moves with ease from the decisions that shaped strategy to the tactical actions before Santiago. Cosmas successfully brings into one story the diplomacy, internal politics, and military strategy of the Army at war in 1898. He shows how the war ultimately led to critical reforms and to a role for the United States Army that shaped twentieth-century history.

An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War

Americas

University of Missouri Press

In America’s popular memory of the Spanish-American War, the all-volunteer Rough Riders won the war in spite of ossified civilian and regular army leadership. In this authoritative account, however, military historian Graham A. Cosmas reconstructs the planning and execution of Spanish-American War strategy from the perspective of those with the ultimate responsibility: the president, the secretary of war, the commanding general of the army, and the chief and commanders of the army’s various bureaus and corps. Cosmas argues that the traditional view of the war is from the bottom up” because, while headlines were being made about inadequate supplies, disease, and outdated weapons at ground level, the civilian and military figures at the highest ranks remained virtually silent about how and why they made their decisions. This volume, based on intensive research in documentary materials, including the personal papers of President William McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, as well as the voluminous files of Adjutant General Henry Clark Corbin and the quartermaster general’s offices, shows the day-to-day progress of the war as the highest-ranking officials saw it, digested it, and based subsequent decisions on it. Faced with budgetary pressure from Congress, political pressure from the states’ National Guard units, and the president’s shifting stand on objectives for the war, the army was indeed ill prepared for its sudden mobilization. Cosmas concludes that the army’s leadership was forced into a difficult new position in 1898, one in which its own new ideas of management and organization coupled with the broad new scope of national political/military objectives failed to address the actual circumstances of the war. After the initial wartime blunders, however, the army solved enough of its problems to make the campaigns in Puerto Rico and the Philippines run more smoothly, though with less news value. As Cosmas shows, the Spanish-American War was a foretaste of the new century, prompting the formation of a modern staff and command system that would profoundly alter world history. This paperback edition of An Army for Empire incorporates the author’s 1994 preface; additional illustrations; and expanded discussion of African American soldiers, the land engagements at San Juan Hill and El Caney, and the period between the August 1898 armistice and Secretary Alger’s departure a year later.

An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series)

Texas A&M University Press

This volume is the standard accurate modern account of the organization, administration, and strategic direction of the United States Army in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Popular history has traditionally laid the responsibility for the spectacular blunders of the Spanish-American War on those military and civilian officials who controlled the War Department. But this fully documented study of all aspects of the Army administration shows quite a different picture. Cosmas, in an almost day-by-day account of both the Army and the war, makes clear the factors that invited many of its disasters. The Congressional penury of the 1890s, the political conflict in Congress between state militia advocates and the Administration, the frequent shifts of strategy forced on the Army by President William McKinley's changes in diplomacy - all contributed to the peculiarly amateur quality of the land forces that went ashore in Cuba. The Puerto Rico and Philippine campaigns, which were prosecuted later and under better circumstances, were more efficiently conducted but less newsworthy. An Army for Empire is a complete and authoritative history that moves with ease from the decisions that shaped strategy to the tactical actions before Santiago. Cosmas successfully brings into one story the diplomacy, internal politics, and military strategy of the Army at war in 1898. He shows how the war ultimately led to critical reforms and to a role for the United States Army that shaped twentieth-century history.

White Mane Pub

The record of the Marine occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924 is presented as an example of the active role played by the Marine Corps in the Caribbean region in the first three decades of the 20th century.

Marines in the Dominican Republic 1916-1924

Fuller USMCR, Capt Stephen M.

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam - 1960-1968 Part 2 (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam: 1960-1968 Part 3 (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

This is the eighth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps’ participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This particular volume details the gradual withdrawl in 1970-1971 of Marine combat forces from South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, as part of an overall American strategy of turning the ground was against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong over to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment 1970 - 1971

Murray USMC, LCol Terrence P.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Cosmas, Graham A.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Cosmas, Graham A.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Cosmas, Graham A.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-1967 (United States Army in Vietnam)

Macv, the Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973

Joint Chiefs Of Staff And The War In Vietnam 1960-1968 Part 3

An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War

An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series)

An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War

Marines in the Dominican Republic 1916-1924

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam - 1960-1968 Part 2 (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam: 1960-1968 Part 3 (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment 1970 - 1971