Law and Economics

With the Fifth Edition of their best-selling text, Cooter and Ulen provide a clear introduction to economic analysis and its application to legal rules and institutions.

Law and Economics (Pearson Series in Economics)

Business & Money

Cooter, Robert D.

Ulen, Thomas

Economics

Pearson

This package contains the following components: -0132566060: Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference 
-0132598515: MyEducationLab Pegasus

Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference with MyEducationLab Pegasus (6th Edition)

Education & Teaching

Reutzel, D.Ray

Schools & Teaching

Allyn&Bacon

Proven to engage students, provide trusted content, and improve results, Pearson MyLabs have helped over 8 million registered students reach true understanding in their course.  MyEducationLab engages students with real-life teaching situations through dynamic videos, case studies and student artifacts.  Student progress is assessed, and a personalized study plan is created based on the student’s unique results.  Automatic grading and reporting keeps educators informed to quickly address gaps and improve student performance.   MyEducationLab ©2012 courses meet instructor and student needs by offering the ability to assign exercises and quizzes, easier navigation, more multiple choice and auto graded quizzes, an improved grade book and other improvements.   MyEducationLab with eText helps students reach that moment of understanding with:    Text-specific study plans offering personalized learning paths  Exercises that build teaching skills and connect students to real classroom situations with assessments tied to real student videos and artifacts  Interactive learning tools including a new Video Player, Lesson Plan Builders and A+RISE (for Literacy)  Pearson eText offering students and instructors the ability to personalize and customize their eText by highlighting, note taking, and extensive search capabilities.

MyEducationLab Pegasus with Pearson eText -- Standalone Access Card -- for Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference

Book by Reutzel, D. Ray, Cooter Jr., Robert B.

NEW MyEducationLab with Pearson eText -- Standalone Access Card -- for Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference (myeducationlab (Access Codes))

Pearson College Div

Law and economics has become a central course in U.S. legal education and for students majoring in topics like economics, political science, and philosophy. With the Fifth Edition of their best-selling text, Cooter and Ulen provide a clear introduction to economic analysis and its application to legal rules and institutions that is accessible to any student who has taken principles of microeconomics. An Introduction to Law and Economics; A Review of Microeconomic Theory; An Introduction to Law and Legal Institutions; An Economic Theory of Property; Topics in the Economics of Property Law; An Economic Theory of Contract; Topics in the Economics of Contract Law; An Economic Theory of Tort Law; Topics in the Economics of Tort Liability; An Economic Theory of the Legal Process; An Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment; Topics in the Economics of Crime and Punishment. For all readers interested in law and economics.

Law and Economics (5th Edition)

The Strategic Constitution

Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance.
 By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods.
 To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments.
 This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.

Princeton University Press

Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy" whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy" Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain

Criminal Law

Sustained growth depends on innovation, whether it's cutting-edge software from Silicon Valley, an improved assembly line in Sichuan, or a new export market for Swaziland's leather. Developing a new idea requires money, which poses a problem of trust. The innovator must trust the investor with his idea and the investor must trust the innovator with her money. Robert Cooter and Hans-Bernd Schäfer call this the "double trust dilemma of development." Nowhere is this problem more acute than in poorer nations, where the failure to solve it results in stagnant economies.
 In Solomon's Knot, Cooter and Schäfer propose a legal theory of economic growth that details how effective property, contract, and business laws help to unite capital and ideas. They also demonstrate why ineffective private and business laws are the root cause of the poverty of nations in today's world. Without the legal institutions that allow innovation and entrepreneurship to thrive, other attempts to spur economic growth are destined to fail.

Solomon's Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations (The Kauffman Foundation Series on Innovation and Entrepreneurship)

Schäfer, Hans-Bernd

How tort, contract, and restitution law can be reformed to better serve the social good
Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good.
In tort law, Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat propose that all foreseeable risks should be included when setting standards of care and awarding damages. Failure to do so causes accidents that better legal incentives would avoid. In contract law, they show that making a promise often causes the person who receives it to change behavior and undermine the cooperation between the parties. They recommend several solutions, including a novel contract called "anti-insurance." In restitution law, people who convey unrequested benefits to others are seldom entitled to compensation. Restitution law should compensate them more than it currently does, so that they will provide more unrequested benefits. In these three areas of law, Getting Incentives Right demonstrates that better law can promote the well-being of people by providing better incentives for the private regulation of conduct.

Getting Incentives Right: Improving Torts, Contracts, and Restitution

Porat, Ariel

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Cooter, Robert D.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Books by Cooter, Robert D.

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Cooter, Robert D.. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Law and Economics (Pearson Series in Economics)

Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference with MyEducationLab Pegasus (6th Edition)

MyEducationLab Pegasus with Pearson eText -- Standalone Access Card -- for Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference

NEW MyEducationLab with Pearson eText -- Standalone Access Card -- for Teaching Children to Read: The Teacher Makes the Difference (myeducationlab (Access Codes))

Law and Economics (5th Edition)

The Strategic Constitution

The Strategic Constitution

Solomon's Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations (The Kauffman Foundation Series on Innovation and Entrepreneurship)

Getting Incentives Right: Improving Torts, Contracts, and Restitution

Solomon's Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations (The Kauffman Foundation Series on Innovation and Entrepreneurship)