Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report

History

Cohen, Eliot A.

Keaney, Thomas A.

Americas

United States Govt Printing Office

"Speak softly and carry a big stick" Theodore Roosevelt famously said in 1901, when the United States was emerging as a great power. It was the right sentiment, perhaps, in an age of imperial rivalry but today many Americans doubt the utility of their global military presence, thinking it outdated, unnecessary or even dangerous. In The Big Stick, Eliot A. Cohen-a scholar and practitioner of international relations-disagrees. He argues that hard power remains essential for American foreign policy. While acknowledging that the US must be careful about why, when, and how it uses force, he insists that its international role is as critical as ever, and armed force is vital to that role. Cohen explains that American leaders must learn to use hard power in new ways and for new circumstances. The rise of a well-armed China, Russia's conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, and the spread of radical Islamist movements like ISIS are some of the key threats to global peace. If the United States relinquishes its position as a strong but prudent military power, and fails to accept its role as the guardian of a stable world order we run the risk of unleashing disorder, violence and tyranny on a scale not seen since the 1930s. The US is still, as Madeleine Albright once dubbed it, "the indispensable nation."

The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

Basic Books

Examines the three types of misfortune--failure to learn, to anticipate, and to adapt--and shows their implication in a variety of defeats in the twentieth century

Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War

Gooch, John

Military

Anchor

WHY DO COMPETENT ARMIES FAIL? Why did the American-led coalition in Iraq fail to wage a classic counter-insurgency campaign for so long after the fall of Baghdad? Why was the sophisticated Israeli intelligence service so thoroughly surprised by the onslaught of combined Arab armies during the Yom Kippur War of 1973? How did a dozen German U-boats manage to humiliate the U.S. Navy for nine months in 1942 - sinking an average of 650,000 tons of shipping monthly? What made the 1915 British-led invasion of Gallipoli one of the bloodiest catastrophes of the First World War? Since it was first published in 1990, Military Misfortunes has become the classic analysis of the unexpected catastrophes that befall competent militaries. Now with a new Afterword discussing America's missteps in Iraq, Somalia, and the War on Terror, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's gripping battlefield narratives and groundbreaking explanations of the hidden factors that undermine armies are brought thoroughly up to date. As recent events prove, Military Misfortunes will be required reading for as long as armies go to war.

Free Press

This text examines leadership in wartime, or more precisely the tension between civil and military leadership. It uncovers the nature of strategy-making by looking at four great democratic war statesman and seeing how they dealt with the military leaders who served them. In doing so it reveals fundamental aspects of leadership and provides not merely an historical analysis but a study of issues that remain crucial today. By examining the cases of four of the greatest war statesman of the 20th century, it explores the problem of how people confront the greatest challenge that can befall them. Beginning with a discussion of civil-military relations from a theoretical point of view, it lays out the conventional beliefs about how politicians should deal with generals and the extent to which either can influence the outcome of war. From these it draws broader lessons for students of leadership generally.

Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Library Edition

Blackstone Pub

The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show, the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen examines four great democratic war statesmen, Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion, to reveal the surprising answer--the politicians. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. The lessons of the book apply not just to President Bush and other world leaders but to anyone who faces extreme adversity at the head of a free organization, including leaders and managers throughout the corporate world.

Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

Blackstone Audiobooks

Supreme Command Lib/E: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

Blackstone Publishing

Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Social Sciences

Cornell Univ Pr

Glossy cover has very light edge wear. Pages are all very clean, no marks found. Ships fast from Northern California.

Cornell University Press

This fascinating study was first published in 1978 by the Harvard University Center for International Affairs.

Commandos and Politicians

University Press of America

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Books by Cohen, Eliot A.