The CIA Document of Human Manipulation: Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual

Agency, Central Intelligence

Reference

Blurb

Built in 1791, standing 85 feet high, 215 feet long and 36 feet wide, this former city gate is one of the most iconic symbols of Berlin and Germany. Throughout its existence it has served as a visual representation of various political ideologies, ranging from Prussia's imperialism to East Germany's communism. It was closed by the East Germans on 14 August 1961 in a response to West Berliners' demonstration against the building of the wall dividing their city into East and West. It remained closed until 22 December 1989. Its design is based upon the gate way to the Propylaea, the entry into the Acropolis in Athens, Greece. It has 12 Doric columns, six to a side, forming five passageways. The central archway is crowned by the Quadriga, a statue consisting of a four horse chariot driven by Victoria, the Roman goddess of victory. After Napoleon's defeat, the Quadriga was returned to Berlin and the wreath of oak leaves on Victoria was replaced with the new symbol of Prussia, the Iron Cross.

A City Torn Apart: Building of the Berlin Wall

History

Europe

Independently published

Between July 1980 and December 13, 1981, Poland stumbled through the most serious political crisis faced by a Warsaw Pact member since the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The resolution of this crisis through the declaration of martial law by the Polish authorities provided only a temporary respite. The rise and suppression of the trade union Solidarity, followed by the inability of Polish communist authorities to restore political credibility or economic activity, were key developments that created the conditions that led to the eventual collapse of the Warsaw Pact by the end of the decade. On one side was a Polish society deeply disenchanted with its political system and the mismanagement of its economy that resulted in increased deprivation in the late 1970's. Initial strikes in July and August 1980 protesting relatively mild increases in meat prices escalated as workers vowed not to accept near-term promises by the authorities. For the first time in post-war Poland, workers were joined by intellectuals bent on changing the broader political system. The meteoric and chaotic rise of Solidarity resulted in a mass movement with increasing determination to pursue fundamental change. Facing this unprecedented development was a communist party apparatus with limited support, even from its members, and one that was lulled into lethargy by the vain hope of restoring calm with the time-tested tactic of buying off the opposition. Senior political and military authorities were averse to using force in the early months because of the memories of the deaths of shipyard workers during the uprisings in the Gdansk shipyards in December 1970. As events spiraled out of control during the 18 months of the crisis, powers that be engaged in lengthy discussions of whether, when, and how Polish authorities could impose order through martial law. This discussion was strongly influenced by the hard line taken by Soviet political and military leaders who continually and arrogantly pushed Polish authorities to immediately resort to force. Soviet officials not so subtly tried to intimidate Polish authorities by implying that they would use both their own forces in addition to other Warsaw Pact forces to restore order (if necessary). Partly out of consideration for self-preservation and partly as a result of intense Soviet pressure, Polish authorities slowly and sometimes grudgingly proceeded with operational planning to introduce martial law. These plans, including all the required legal documentation, were essentially completed by the fall of 1981. In 1972, Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff, volunteered his services to the United States at a time of increased friction between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. Over the coming years, Kuklinski provided the CIA with thousands of pieces of key information regarding the Warsaw Pact. During the Polish crisis he continued to provide such information and also provided information and commentary regarding internal Polish developments and Soviet pressures.

Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski

World

This collection of presidential briefing products, spanning the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford presidential administrations, is the first large-scale release of its kind. The President's Intelligence Checklists (PICLs) [an acronym pronounced "pickles"] and The President's Daily Briefs (PDBs) in this collection include more than 4,000 documents spanning about 15 years. This is an unprecedented release because of the exclusiveness of the documents in the collection. These documents were, and still are "eyes only," all-source1 publications written specifically for the president; they summarize the day-to-day intelligence and analysis on current and future national security issues. In addition to the PDBs and PICLs, the collection includes The President's Intelligence Review and its replacement, Highlights of the Week, as well as ad hoc supplemental products from other intelligence organizations and annexes that feature topics of presidential interest.

The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Kennedy and Johnson

Military

The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Nixon and Ford

Profiles in Leadership: Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency & Its Predecessors

These documents cover the period from January 1977 through March 1979 and were produced by the CIA to support the Carter administration's diplomatic efforts leading up to President Carter's negotiations with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in September 1978. The declassified documents detail diplomatic developments from the Arab peace offensive and President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem through the regionwide aftermath of Camp David. Newly released items include: - Two National Intelligence Estimates on Egypt and the Middle East Military Balance. - Selections from CIA's briefing book on Camp David created for President Carter. - Leadership profiles from the Directorate of Intelligence on the key personalities of the Camp David summit. - Intelligence on informal and formal inter-Arab negotiations and divisions between Israeli political parties with regard to the peace initiative and summit. - The role of Jordan in the peace process - Over four hundred pages of Foreign Broadcast Information Service reporting, capturing the press coverage of the negotiations, summit, and global reaction. The documents convey a sense of the personalities, perils, and ambiguities that pervaded the lead-up to the Camp David Accords, which despite the many obstacles has had an enduring influence in the precarious peace between Israel and its largest Arab neighbor.

President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords

Politics & Social Sciences

Politics & Government

This study makes extensive use of information drawn from internal, classified CIA files- from the records of the directors of central intelligence and of the staffs that assisted them in their role as leaders of the US Intelligence Community; from interviews conducted as part of CIA's oral history program; from organizational histories and biographies of directors of central intelligence; and from Studies in Intelligence, a journal published by CIA since 1955. With some exceptions, these sources are not individually cited in the footnotes. These internal, classified resources supplement openly available material, such as declassified official histories (Troy, Darling, Montague, and Jackson) covering William Donovan and the first five DCIs, as well as a number of memoirs, biographies, books, and commission studies devoted to intelligence, all of which are listed in the bibliography. The bibliography also lists the interviews conducted by the author for this study.

Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946–2005

Garthoff, Douglas F.

Intelligence, Center for the Study of

Americas

lulu.com

Did you ever lose your keys? Lock picking is the skill of unlocking a lock by analyzing and manipulating the components of the lock device, without the original key. Although lock picking can be associated with criminal intent, it is an essential skill for a locksmith. Lock picking is the ideal way of opening a lock without the correct key, while not damaging the lock, allowing it to be rekeyed for later use, which is especially important with antique locks that would be impossible to replace if destructive entry methods were used.

CIA Lock Picking: Field Operative Training Manual

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

This is a study of the CIA’s relationship with Congress. It encompasses the period from the creation of the Agency until 2004—the era of the DCIs. When Congress created a new position in December 2004—the director of national intelligence—to supersede the director of central intelligence (DCI) as head of the US Intelligence Community, it necessarily changed the dynamic between the CIA and the Congress. While the director of the Agency would continue to represent its interests on Capitol Hill, he or she would no longer speak as the head of US intelligence. While 2008 is too early to assess how this change will affect the Agency’s relationship with Congress, it is safe to say it will never be quite the same. This study is not organized as one might expect. It does not describe what occurred between the Agency and Congress in chronological order nor does it purport to describe every interaction that occurred over the period encompassed by the study. Rather it attempts to describe what the relationship was like over time and then look at what it produced in seven discrete areas. I took this approach for several reasons. First, I found that telling the story in chronological sequence tended to obscure the lessons of the past, rather than illuminate them. Taking everything at once and bringing it forward made it more difficult to discern what was happening. The forest obscured the trees, if you will. Moreover, not everything that transpired in the course of the relationship can be considered historically significant. Even if it were possible to recount every interaction that took place between the Agency and Congress over the 58-year period covered by this study (and it isn’t), readers would be wasting their time delving into it. “Slicing and dicing” the subject matter in this way, however, did inevitably lead to a degree of duplication. I tried to deal with this problem by limiting the explanatory material in each chapter to that which was necessary to understanding the points being made in that chapter, even if the same explanatory material were also needed (to a lesser or greater extent) to understand the points being made in other chapters. Hopefully, the reader will bear this in mind (and remain tolerant) where the duplication occurs. An element of subjectivity was also involved in choosing the examples used in the study. Several factors influenced my choices here. First, I wanted to confine myself to episodes that were historically significant and/or would best highlight the issues identified. I also chose episodes, where possible, that had some prior public context. Without it, not only would more explanation be required, but the chances of having it declassified would be practically nil. My intent was to produce an unclassified study, something that could be read by Agency employees outside the office. Readers may be surprised to learn that this created less of a problem than one might expect, since most of the significant interaction that has occurred between Congress and the Agency involves matters that have previously been disclosed in some manner. The reader should not expect to find, however, detailed descriptions of the episodes chosen for the narrative. In order to keep the study to a manageable length, I deliberately tried to distill the descriptions of the events I chose into readable summaries. What I am principally concerned with here is the congressional involvement in these episodes, not with what the Agency did or did not do that prompted Congress to become involved. Indeed, books have been written about many of the episodes described here. I am not attempting to replicate what is already in the public domain with respect to the Agency’s past, but rather to describe how the Agency engaged with Congress with respect to its past. Readers who want more detail concerning the Agency’s activities alluded to in the study will need to consult other sources.

The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004

Snider, L. Britt

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