Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (Asian Security Studies)

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia presents a penetrating new investigation of religious radicalism in the largest Muslim country in the world. Indonesia is a country long known for its diversity and tolerant brand of Islam. However, since the fall of Suharto, a more intolerant form of Islam has been growing, one whose adherents have carried out terrorist attacks, waged sectarian war, and voiced strident anti-Western rhetoric.  Zachary Abuza’s unique analysis of radical Islam draws upon primary documents such as Jemaah Islamiyah’s operations manual, interviews, and recorded testimonies of politicians, religious figures, and known militants, as well as personal interviews with numerous security and intelligence experts in Indonesia and elsewhere, to paint a picture at once guardedly optimistic about the future of Indonesian democracy and concerned about the increasing role of conservative and radical Islam in Indonesian society. This book will be of great interest to students of Indonesian politics, Asian studies, political violence and security studies in general.

Abuza, Zachary

Reference

Routledge

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia

Until recently, Southeast Asia was plagued by separatist insurgencies that had simmered, seemingly intractable, for several decades. But peace processes in Indonesia and the Philippines have been some of the most innovative and successful in the world—a model and counterpoint for Thailand and other protracted conflicts. Since the 1970s, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have wrestled with secessionist groups. Each government entered into peace talks then, though without any sincerity or willingness to make significant concessions. By the turn of the millennium, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines began to reevaluate their strategies while insurgents came to the conclusion that the changed global environment and waning capabilities made victory unlikely. Further, the impact of the 2004 tsunami brought not only another impetus, but also the involvement of the international donor community and peace processes began in both countries where they were successfully implemented. Successful devolution of political and economic powers that protected the cultural rights of the minority population, as well as substantial wealth sharing brought an end to these conflicts. Such successful peace building efforts serve as both a model and counterpoint for Thailand. Each of the case studies begins with a history of the insurgency, an analysis of the insurgent group’s organization, operations, tactics, and capabilities before delving into the history of the peace processes and analyzing the factors that made them successful. Nothing is harder than a peace process, but the lessons of Southeast Asia show that it is made possible through such factors as a national devaluation of power, bold and creative statesmanship, the successful neutralization of spoilers, and the role of neutral third party facilitators. These cases provide important lessons for the fields of counterinsurgency and peace making.

Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation (Peace and Security in the 21st Century)

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

Since the 1970s, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have wrestled with secessionist groups. They serve as case studies in this book. Each begins with a history of the insurgency, an analysis of the insurgent group's organization, operations, tactics, and capabilities before delving into the history of the peace processes and analyzing the factors that made them successful. Nothing is harder than a peace process, but the lessons of Southeast Asia show it is made possible through such factors as a national devaluation of power, bold and creative statesmanship, the successful neutralization of spoilers, and the role of neutral third party facilitators. These cases provide important lessons for the fields of counterinsurgency and peace making.

Since January 2004, a Malay-Muslim-based insurgency has engulfed the three southernmost provinces in Thailand. More than 4,500 people have been killed and over 9,000 wounded, making it the most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia. Now in its 8th year, the insurgency has settled into a low-level stalemate. Violence is down significantly from its mid-2007 peak, but it has been steadily climbing since 2008. On average, 32 people are being killed and 58 wounded every month. Most casualties are from drive-by shootings, but there are also about 12 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks a month. The insurgency is now characterized by less indiscriminate violence and more retaliatory attacks. Insurgents continue to target security forces, government officials, and Muslim moderates who seek accommodation with the Thai state as part of efforts to make the region ungovernable by limiting provision of social services and driving Buddhists from the south. The overall level of violence may be influenced more by insurgent calculations about the optimum amount of violence needed to advance their political goals than by improved capabilities of the security forces. Despite better coordination, Thai counterinsurgency operations are still hampered by bureaucratic infighting and a lack of professionalism. Human rights abuses by security services with blanket immunity under the Emergency Decree continue to instill mistrust among the local population. Moreover, as long as violence is contained in the deep south, the insurgency will remain a low priority for the new Thai government, which is focused on national political disputes and is reluctant to take on the military by pursuing more conciliatory policies toward the south. Indeed, even under the 30-month tenure of the Democrat Party with an electoral base in the south, the insurgency was a very low priority and its few policy initiatives were insufficient to quell the violence. The new Pheu Thai government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the younger sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a September 2006 coup, will have its hands tied in the south. Its election victory and focus on national reconciliation have already engendered mistrust of the Thai military. The new government will be reluctant to criticize the military's handling of the insurgency, take on the culture of impunity, or push for any form of political autonomy. This will make any devolution of political authority unlikely, limiting chances for a negotiated solution. As a result, low level violence is likely to continue indefinitely. The most important immediate U.S. objective in Thailand is political stability at the national level and deepening bilateral economic ties. Absent a cohesive Thai government with the political will to overcome military resistance to policies that might address underlying causes of the insurgency, U.S. pressure to do more is likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive. Accordingly, the United States should maintain quiet diplomatic pressure on the government to broaden its counterinsurgency efforts and offer any requested intelligence and law enforcement assistance, while being cognizant of Thai sensitivity over its sovereignty.

The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics: Institute for ... Studies, Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Politics & Social Sciences

University, National Defense

Politics & Government

CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has ruled continuously in the northern half of Vietnam since 1954, and throughout the country since 1975. Abuza (political science and international relations, Simmons College) reveals the ongoing friction between the VCP and dissident groups. He explains what the coalescence of Vietnamese politics under one party has meant politically, culturally, and psychologically for the Vietnamese people. He traces shifts in political currents from the VCP's rise to power to the present debates of intellectual freedom, focusing on dissent since the economic reform plan launched in 1986. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam

Lynne Rienner Pub

Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia has moved beyond a matter of local concern to one of global significance - as the events of the past decade have so clearly demonstrated. Drawing on intensive on-the-ground investigation and interviews with key militants, Zachary Abuza explains the emergence of radical Islamist groups in the region, examines Al-Qaida's role as organizational catalyst, and explores individual and multilateral state responses to the growing - and increasingly violent - Islamic political consciousness.

Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror

Religion & Spirituality

Islam

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Books by Abuza, Zachary

See the best price to sell, buy, or rent books by Abuza, Zachary. BookScouter helps to compare book prices from 25+ online bookstores and 30+ buyback vendors with a single search.

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (Asian Security Studies)

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (Asian Security Studies)

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia

Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia

Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation (Peace and Security in the 21st Century)

Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation (Peace and Security in the 21st Century)

The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics: Institute for ... Studies, Strategic Perspectives, No. 6

Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam

Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror

Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror