Chilcot Report: Executive Summary

The key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair.

Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as there 'Chilcot Report') tackled:

• Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain
• the legal advice for the invasion
• intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and
• planning for a post-conflict Iraq.

This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016.

Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books:

'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'

Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million.

The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document.


Table of Contents

Introduction

Pre-conflict strategy and planning

The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11The impact of 9/11Decision to take the UN routeNegotiation of resolution 1441The prospect of military actionThe gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widensThe end of the UN route

Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq

The UK’s relationship with the US

Decision-making. Collective responsibility

Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003The search for WMD

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risksThe planning process and decision-making

Occupation. Looting in BasraLooting in BaghdadUK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483UK influence on the Coalition Provisional AuthorityA decline in securityThe turning point

Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPAPlanning for withdrawalThe impact of AfghanistanIraqiisation

Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategyA possible civil warForce Level ReviewThe beginning of the end

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

• Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to CrawfordDevelopment of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 Sep 2002
• Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003WMD search
• Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003Development of the military options for an invasion of IraqMilitary planning for the invasion, January to March 2003Military equipment (pre-conflict)Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein IraqInvasion
• Key Findings 4. The post-conflict periodReconstructionDe-Ba’athificationSecurity Sector ReformResourcesMilitary equipment (post-conflict)Civilian personnelService PersonnelCivilian casualties

Lessons. The decision to go to warWeapons of mass destructionThe invasion of IraqThe post-conflict periodReconstructionDe-Ba’athificationSecurity Sector ReformResourcesMilitary equipment (post-conflict)Civilian personnel

Timeline of events