Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy (POLICY ANALYSES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS)

The catastrophic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 marks the tragic end to Argentina's initially successful, decade-long experiment with sound money and market-oriented economic reform. The IMF consistently supported Argentina's stabilization and reform efforts in the decade leading up to the current crisis, and often pointed to many of Argentina's policies as examples for other emerging market economies to emulate. In this policy analysis, former IMF Chief Economist Michael Mussa addresses the obvious question: what went wrong in Argentina and what important errors did the IMF make in either supporting inappropriate policies or in failing to press for alternatives that might have avoided catastrophe? He emphasizes that the persistent inability of the Argentine authorities at all levels to run a responsible fiscal policy - even when the Argentine economy was performing very well - was the primary avoidable cause of the country's catastrophic financial collapse. The IMF failed to press aggressively for a more responsible fiscal policy.