Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Volume 14) (Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science)

These provocative essays by leading philosophers of science exemplify and illuminate the contemporary uncertainty and excitement in the field. The papers are rich in new perspectives, and their far-reaching criticisms challenge arguments long prevalent in classic philosophical problems of induction, empiricism, and realism. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the authors' arguments both describe and demonstrate the fact that philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday of logical positivism early in the twentieth century.

 

Contents:

 

"Thoroughly Modern Meno," Clark Glymour and Kevin Kelly

"The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry," Jaakko Hintikka

"Aristotelian Natures and Modern Experimental Method," Nancy Cartwright

"Genetic Inference: A Reconsideration of "David Hume's Empiricism," Barbara D. Massey and Gerald J. Massey

"Philosophy and the Exact Sciences: Logical Positivism as a Case Study," Michael Friedman

"Language and Interpretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry," Noam Chomsky

"Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method," Richard Boyd

"Do We Need a Hierarchical Model of Science?" Diderik Batens

"Theories of Theories: A View from Cognitive Science," Richard E. Grandy

"Procedural Syntax for Theory Elements," Joseph D. Sneed

"Why Functionalism Didn't Work," Hilary Putnam

"Physicalism," Hartry Field